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I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended 'Title
VII," prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace.' The courts have
created two categories of sexual harassment. 2 The first, quid pro quo
sexual harassment, occurs when a supervisor requires sexual consid-
eration from an employee in exchange for job benefits.3 The second,
hostile work environment sexual harassment, occurs when an em-
ployee is subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment that affects a
term, condition, or privilege of employment.4 The victim must prove
that the harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of hers employment and create an abusive working envi-
ronment.6
1. 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(a) (1988) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportu-
nities or otherwise adversely affect his status an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
See also the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex ("Guidelines"), 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1994). These Guidelines provide:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Section 703 of Title VII. Unwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2)
submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for em-
ployment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or ef-
fect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (citations omitted).
Courts often give substantial deference to these Guidelines. "As an 'administrative inter-
pretation of the Act by the enforcing agency,' these Guidelines, 'while not controlling upon the
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.'" Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971);
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)) (citations ommitted).
2. See, for example, Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1557, 1564
(11th Cir. 1987) (recognizing quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment);
Karibian v. Columbia University, 14 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1994) (same).
3. Sparks, 830 F.2d at 1564. Sexual harassment that results in a tangiblejob detriment
has also been recognized as quid pro quo harassment. See, for example, Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982); Karibian, 14 F.3d at 778.
4. Sparks, 830 F.2d at 1557.
5. While the Author recognizes that Title VII proscribes sexual harassment directed by
females against males, research suggests that women are most often the victims of such dis-
crimination. See United States Merit Systems Protection Board, Sexual Harassment in the
1058
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Any victim of sexual harassment seeking redress for the wrong
committed against her must establish that sexual harassment oc-
curred. 7 This showing, however, may not resolve the issue in the
victim's favor. For the victim to receive full recovery, the court must
hold the employer liable for the sexual harassment.8 If the court
refuses to make this finding, the victim's relief may be substantially
diminished or even eviscerated by the fact that individual supervisors
are not as well-situated as are their employers to provide the make-
whole relief contemplated by Title VII.9
Employer liability, thus, becomes the heart of a sexual har-
assment claim.1° In addressing the issue of employer liability, courts
uniformly hold employers strictly liable for quid pro quo sexual
Federal Workplace: Is It a Problem? 2-3 (1981) (reporting that in a survey of 23,000 male and
female federal employees, 42% of the women who responded reported experiencing some form of
sexual harassment); Mary Joe Frug, Women and the Law 179 (1991) (reporting that sexual
harassment is an issue that confronts every woman in the course of her career, either directly or
through a friend's experience); Barbara A. Gutek, Sex and the Workplace 159-67 (Jossey-Bass,
1985) (arguing that unlike women, men consider a sexualized work environment part of the
employment institution's background). Men are likely to consider sexual overtures and
comments appropriate and believe that women will appreciate these overtures at work. Men
seldom label sexual incidents as harassment. On the other hand, women feel the repercussions
of sexual environments at work. Id. This Note, therefore, is written in the context of males
sexually harassing females. The legal analysis suggested in this Note applies equally to cases in
which men are the victims of sexual harassment.
6. Sparks, 830 F.2d at 1557 (quoting Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67).
7. In Sparks, the Tenth Circuit held that in order to establish a prima facie case of
hostile work environment sexual harassment, the plaintiff must prove:
(1) that the employee belongs to a protected group;
(2) that the employee was subject to "unwelcome" sexual harassment;
(3) that the harassment complained of was based on sex; and
(4) that the harassment complained of affected a "term, condition, or privilege" of
employment in that it was "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment."
Id.
8. The district court in Sparks held for the employer on summary judgment because the
employee failed to establish what it considered to be a necessary fifth element: the employer's
liability for its supervisor's actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. But see Part
I.B (discussing the court's misuse of the term "respondeat superior"). See also note 135
(explaining the difference between respondeat superior and agency principles). The Court of
Appeals, however, recognized that if the supervisor acted as an agent of his employer when
committing sexual harassment, the employer is directly liable if the plaintiff proves the other
four elements of her prima facie case. Id. at 1558. See also note 7 (setting out the elements of a
prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual harassment).
9. Brief for Respondent at 32-33, Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986) (No. 84-1979) ("Respondents Brief").
10. In their brief, Patricia Barry and Catharine MacKinnon argued to the Supreme Court
that employer liability "is the heart of the dispute. It is not an abstract contest over whether
sexual harassment is sex discrimination, which is undisputed. It is a concrete conflict over
whether sexual harassment will be treated as if it is sex discrimination: whether the employer
will be responsible so that its victims receive relief." Id. at 26.
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harassment., The employer is directly liable and the plaintiff need
not prove an agency relationship.12 The rationale supporting this rule
recognizes that when the employer gives its supervisors the authority
to fire employees, it must also accept responsibility to remedy the
harm caused by the supervisors' unlawful exercise of that authority. 3
Hostile work environment sexual harassment is distinct from
quid pro quo sexual harassment in that the perpetrator of the har-
assment need not be the victim's supervisor. 4 A hostile work envi-
11. See, for example, Horn v. Duke Homes, Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d
599, 604-06 (7th Cir. 1985) (adopting a rule of strict liability for employers' acts); Craig v. Y & Y
Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 80-81 (3rd Cir. 1983) (finding liability where supervisor had
"unbridled authority to retaliate"); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 n.6 (4th Cir. 1983) (noting
that plaintiff met both strict liability in her quid pro quo claim and constructive notice in her
condition of work claim); Henson, 682 F.2d at 910 (attaching strict liability in quid pro quo and
tangible detriment claims); Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979)
(identifying the incongruous result if an employer is not liable for the discriminatory acts of an
employee).
12. Sparks, 830 F.2d at 1564 n.22 (citing Henson, 682 F.2d at 909). See also 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(b) (1989) (defining "employer" to include agents); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (holding the
employer strictly liable for acts of its agents and supervisors).
13. Henson, 682 F.2d at 909. Since the modern corporation can exist only through the
individuals who manage it, little progress would be made in eradicating employment discrimi-
nation if the corporate employer is not held liable for this individual misconduct. Id.
14. But see Barbara Verdonik, Abolishing the Quid Pro Quo and Work Environment
Distinctions in Sexual Harassment Cases Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Vinson v. Taylor,
60 St. John's L. Rev. 177, 188-90 (1985) (arguing for the abolition of the distinction between quid
pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment).
While it is beyond the scope of this Note, there is a strong argument for abolishing the
distinction between quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment when the
accused is a supervisor. First, on a practical level, many cases could be characterized
interchangably as hostile work environment or quid pro quo cases. Henson, 682 F.2d at 908
n.18. By creating a legal distinction where one does not exist, the courts merely engender
greater confusion than necessary. This confusion is especially likely when an issue as
important as the standard of employer liability hinges on the resolution of the distinction.
One claimed justification for the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile work envi-
ronment harassment is that in a case of quid pro quo harassment the victim suffers a tangible
job detriment, whereas in a hostile work environment case she does not. See Sparks, 830 F.2d
at 1564 (stating that "a tangible job detriment" is the "essence" of a claim of quid pro quo har-
assment). This alleged distinction, however, ignores the fact that a woman who is victimized by
a hostile work environment is merely given a choice between putting up with the harassment or
leaving her job. If the victim chooses to leave her job, she clearly suffers a tangible job detri-
ment. Similarly, being forced to work in a hostile environment is also a job detriment of grave
seriousness, regardless of whether a court chooses to term the detriment "tangible."
The victim of a hostile work environment may also choose a third option, namely seeking
remedial action from the employer or a court of law while the victim continues in her employ-
ment. In addition to reducing the pervasiveness of sexual harassment, Title VII jurisprudence
should aim to make this third choice as realistic and attractive as possible to victims of sexual
discrimination. This scenario is attractive because it minimizes the costs and damages incurred
by both the employer and the employee as well as eliminating the harassment from the work-
place.
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ronment can be created by a victim's co-worker, or even someone
outside of the victim's place of employment, such as a customer or a
client.1 5 In non-supervisory hostile work environment sexual harass-
ment cases, the employer is held liable if it knew or should have
known of the conduct, unless it took immediate and appropriate cor-
rective action.'6
In cases in which supervisors create a hostile work environ-
ment, the standard of employer liability has not been clearly estab-
lished. At one extreme, some courts have held employers strictly
liable for a supervisor's hostile environment sexual harassment. 17
Other courts have gravitated to the other extreme and have held
employers liable only upon a showing of notice of the harassment and
failure by the employer to take adequate remedial action.18
A second justification for the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile work environment
sexual harassment claims is that an individual supervisor may lack any special ability to create
a hostile work environment by virtue of his position of power. Henson, 682 F.2d at 910. This
argument, however, is also flawed. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 74-78 (Marshall, J., concurring)
(arguing for imputation of liability for supervisors' hostile work environments). Many
supervisors are "charged with the day-to-day supervision of the work environment and with
ensuring a safe, productive workplace." Id. at 76. If a supervisor in this situation creates a
hostile work environment, his ability to do so is clearly enhanced by the authority vested in him
by his employer.
Some commentators argue that maintaining the distinction between quid pro quo and
hostile work environment harassment provides an excuse for judges to engage in results-
oriented decisionmaking. In other words, courts cling to the distinction so that judges can label
a case quid pro quo or hostile work environment based on the result that they feel is appropriate
in any given case. The result is that only "serious" cases of harassment are labeled "quid pro
quo" (for example, cases men also find offensive). See generally Rachel E. Lutner, Note,
Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment: The Morass of Agency Principles and Respondeat
Superior, 1993 U. ill. L. Rev. 589 (arguing that "reliance on agency law has not established a
clear standard" for employer liability).
15. For examples of cases involving non-supervisory harassment, see Ellison v. Brady, 924
F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing corrective action); Katz, 709 F.2d at 256 (finding notice
and absence of corrective action); Barrett v. Omaha National Bank, 726 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir.
1984) (stating consonance with Katz); Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 621 (6th
Cir. 1986) (stating that plaintiff has the burden of showing actual or constructive notice and
failure to correct); Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 421 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that
plaintiff has the burden of showing actual or constructive notice and failure to correct).
The EEOC Guidelines provide: "With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an
employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or
its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can
show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d).
16. Id.
17. See, for example, Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 149-50 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (charging an
employer with the discriminatory acts of its supervisors); Horn, 755 F.2d at 605-06 (construing
Title VII to demand strict liability).
18. See, for example, Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir. 1988)
(requiring notice in order to hold an employer liable for a violation of Title IX); Jones v. Flagship
International, 793 F.2d 714, 719-20 (5th Cir. 1986) (requiring the plaintiff to show "that the
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The Supreme Court, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,19
declined to issue a definitive ruling on employer liability for hostile
environment harassment committed by a supervisor, but suggested
that lower courts should look to agency principles for guidance in this
area.20 The Court also rejected the two extreme approaches taken by
the lower courts. First, it rejected strict liability by holding that
employers are not always automatically liable for sexual harassment
by their supervisors.21 Second, the court rejected the notice require-
ment imposed by a number of lower courts and held that an alleged
victim's failure to invoke an existing grievance procedure would not
necessarily insulate the employer from liability.22
The Supreme Court's directive in Meritor has resulted in in-
consistency and confusion in the lower courts. Some of the circuit
courts have seemingly ignored the Meritor opinion and continue to
apply their pre-Meritor test.23 Other courts have attempted to apply
agency principles with widely varying results.24 The Supreme Court
or Congress must clearly articulate what a proper application of
agency principles entails. Such clarification would create certainty
regarding an employer's potential liability, clarify for victims what
their rights and available remedies are, and give lower courts a
straightforward and consistent standard to apply.
Part II of this Note discusses the proceedings in the courts
below that preceded the writ of certiorari in the Meritor case,
including the district court's imposition of a notice requirement and
the circuit court's reversal and subsequent imposition of strict
liability. It then discusses the three opinions written in the Meritor
case itself and concludes, as does Justice Stevens, that a proper
analysis of agency principles will reconcile the facially conflicting
opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Marshall. This approach results
in employer liability in most cases of supervisory hostile environment
harassment without imposing the absolute liability that the majority
and concurrence explicitly reject.
employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt
remedial action").
19. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
20. Id. at 72.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See note 139 (discussing several cases that appear to have ignored Meritor's man-
dates).
24. See Part III.
1062 [Vol. 48:1057
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Part III discusses which agency principles are relevant in the
sexual harassment context, how the lower courts have applied those
principles, and how a proper application of those principles should be
achieved. This proper application of agency principles would result in
employer liability whenever someone who has been delegated power
abuses that power to create a hostile work environment for a subordi-
nate. Part IV concludes by arguing that the foregoing result is sound,
both for policy reasons and in keeping with the broad remedial
scheme envisioned by the advocates of Title VII.
II. MERITOR SAVINGS BANK, FSB V. VINSON
A Proceedings Below
In 1974, Mechelle Vinson was hired by Sidney Taylor, a vice
president of Meritor Savings Bank and manager of one of its branch
offices.25 Vinson started working as a teller-trainee, and was later
promoted to teller, head teller, and assistant branch manager as a
result of merit.26 In September, 1978, Vinson notified Taylor that she
was taking sick leave for an indefinite period.27 On November 1, 1978,
the bank discharged her for excessive use of that leave.28 Vinson
brought an action against Taylor and the bank alleging that she had
been subjected to sexual harassment by Taylor in violation of Title
VII.29 Vinson sought injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive
damages against Taylor and the bank, and attorney's fees.O
25. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 59.
26. Id. at 59-60.
27. Id. at 60.
28. Id.
29. Vinson alleged that shortly after her probationary period, Taylor "invited her out to
dinner and, during the course of the meal, suggested that they go to a motel to have sexual
relations." Id. at 61. Vinson claimed that she initially refused this advance, but out of "fear of
losing her job," she ultimately agreed. Id. Taylor allegedly continued repeatedly to demand
sexual favors from Vinson, usually at the bank, both during and after regular business hours.
Id. Vinson claimed that over the course of her employment at the bank she had intercourse
with Taylor 40 or 50 times. Id. Furthermore, Vinson testified that Taylor "fondled her in front
of other employees, followed her into the women's restroom when she went there alone, exposed
himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several occasions." Id. Finally, Vinson testified
that she was afraid of Taylor and, therefore, never reported Taylor's harassment to any of his
supervisors and never used the bank's complaint procedure. Id. at 61.
30. Id. at 60.
1995] 1063
HeinOnline -- 48 Vand. L. Rev.  1063 1995
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Taylor denied Vinson's allegations and contended that they
were made in response to a business related dispute.31 The bank also
denied Vinson's allegations and contended that it should be absolved
from liability, as any sexual harassment that might have occurred
was unknown to the bank and engaged in without its consent or ap-
proval.3 2
The district court33 held that no sexual harassment occurred,3
but went on to discuss the standard of employer liability in dicta.
After pointing out that the bank had an express policy against dis-
crimination and that no one had ever lodged a complaint alleging
sexual harassment by Taylor, the court concluded that the bank's
liability should turn on whether it had notice of Taylor's alleged mis-
conduct.35 Since the court found that the bank did not have such no-
tice, it concluded that the bank could not be held liable for Taylor's
alleged actions.36
The district court did not explain the rationale behind its
requirement of notice in a supervisory hostile environment sexual
harassment case. It did, however, attempt to justify its finding that
notice to Taylor, who was the plaintiffs supervisor, branch manager,
and assistant vice president of the bank, did not constitute notice to
the bank.37 The court pointed out that while Taylor had the authority
to make personnel recommendations, he did not have the authority to
hire, fire, or promote.m The court, therefore, found that it would be
unreasonable to hold employers liable when notice to the employer
depends upon the perpetrator of the harassment and there are no
other facts to place the employer on notice.39
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit4o reversed the hold-
ing of the District Court and remanded the case for the court to de-
31. Id. at61
32. Id.
33. Vinson v. Taylor, 23 FEP Cases (BNA) 37,42 (D. D.C. 1980).
34. Rather than resolving the conflicting testimony regarding whether a sexual relation-
ship between Vinson and Taylor had occurred, the district court found that "if [respondent] and
Taylor did engage in an intimate or sexual relationship during the time of [respondent's] em-
ployment with [the bank], that relationship was a voluntary one having nothing to do with her
continued employment at [the bank] or her advancement or promotions at that institution." Id.
at 43.
35. Id. at 42.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 41.
38. Id. at 42.
39. Id.
40. Vinson, 753 F.2d at 141.
1064 [Vol. 48:1057
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termine whether Taylor created a hostile work environment in viola-
tion of Title VII.41 The court also addressed the issue of whether Title
VII imposes liability upon an employer that does not have specific
notice of sexual harassment by supervisory personnel responsible for
creating a hostile work environment. 42  In answering that question
affinmatively, the court relied on the statutory definition of
"employer, 43 the EEOC Guidelines,44 precedent in Title VII jurispru-
dence,45 and the remedial scheme embodied by Title VII.46
41. The court pointed out that there are two separate avenues by which a plaintiff may
demonstrate unlawful sex discrimination. Id. at 144. Abolition of the job of a female because
she spurned her male superiors sexual advances constitutes one type of Title VII violation. Id.
at 144-45 (citing Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 893, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). A violation also occurs
when a woman employee is subjected to pervasive on-the-job sexual harassment by her
supervisors. Id. at 145 (citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). The court
recognized that Vinson's allegations were of the latter type. Id. The district court, however,
held that Vinson "was not required to grant Taylor or any other member of [the bank] sexual
favors as a condition of either her employment or in order to obtain promotion." Id. at 144
(quoting Vinson, 23 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) at 42). The court of appeals pointed out that this
finding was not conclusive because an infringement of Title VII is not necessarily dependent
upon the victim's loss of employment or promotion. Id.
42. Id. at 147.
43. "'Employer' is defined as 'a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce' with a
workforce of specified size, 'and any agent of such a person...'" Id. at 148 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(b)). "Taken literally, then, Title VII as much outlaws sex discrimination by an 'agent' of
an association as by the association itself." Id. The court went on to say that it is clear that
Taylor was the bank's "agent" with respect to other employees of that branch, and, therefore,
the sexual harassment charged to Taylor was forbidden sex discrimination. Id.
44. The EEOC Guidelines state:
Applying general Title VII principles, an employer.., is responsible for its acts and
those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment regard-
less of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the
employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of their
occurrence. The Commission will examine the circumstances of the particular employ-
ment relationship and the job junctions [sic] performed by the individual in determining
whether an individual acts in either a supervisory or agency capacity.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c).
45. The court pointed out that its own precedent established that sexual harassment is a
violation of Title VII. Vinson, 753 F.2d at 149 (citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C.
Cir. 1981)). The court also saw no reason to treat hostile environment sexual harassment any
differently from racial or religious discrimination. Id. The court stated that the case law in
these areas established that "an employer is chargeable with Title VII violations occasioned by
discriminatory practices of supervisory personnel." Id. (quoting Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983,
993 & n.71 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). See also Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(holding that racial harassment by supervisor in course of duties is enough to support finding
that supervisors acts are "deliberate" acts of employer); Calcote v. Texas Educ. Found., Inc., 578
F.2d 95, 98 (5th Cir. 1978) (same); Young v. Southwestern Savings & Loan Association, 509 F.2d
140, 144 n. 7 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding employer liable under Title VII for supervisor's religious
discrimination although supervisor had no authority to fire and employer had no opportunity to
correct problem); Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hospital, Inc., 464 F.2d 723, 725 (6th Cir.
1972) (holding employer liable under Title VII for supervisor's racially discriminatory discharge
of employee despite employer's "outstanding record in regard to fair and impartial treatment of
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The court concluded that an employer may be held liable for
sexual harassment by any supervisory employee with authority to
hire, promote, or fire.47 The court also held that vicarious liability
should not be limited to the acts of supervisors with this quantum of
authority. Rather, the existence or appearance of a significant degree
of influence in vital job decisions gives any supervisor the opportunity
to take advantage of subordinates.48 According to the court, this op-
portunity arises in the supervisor's ability to direct subordinates in
their work, evaluate their performances, and recommend personnel
actions.49 Hence, the court held that employers should be strictly
liable for the sexual harassment of any subordinate by any supervis-
ing superior.50
The court then justified its holding based on the policies under-
lying Title VII. It stated that requiring notice as a prerequisite to
employer liability would encourage employers to ignore signs of
discriminatory practice.51 A progressive interpretation of Title VII
would create an incentive for employers to take a more active role in
ensuring a working environment free from illegal sex discrimination.52
the races"); Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1282 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding
employer liable under Title VII for any race-based violation occasioned by any person in
authorized capacity as supervisor).
46. The court pointed out that in answering the question of employer liability for the
hostile environment harassment of a supervisor, it was not resorting to the common-law
doctrine of respondeat superior. Vinson, 753 F.2d at 150. The court felt that these principles
were not suitable for resolving questions of Title VII law, noting:.
Title VII is a mandate from Congress to cure a perceived evil--certain types of discrimi-
nation in employment-in a prescribed fashion. Rules of tort law, on the other hand,
have evolved over centuries to meet diverse societal demands by allocating risks of harm
and duties of care. Without clear congressional instruction, we think it unsafe in devel-
oping Title VII jurisprudence to rely uncritically on dogma thus begotten.
Id. at 150-51. The court went on to argue that applying common-law principles to Title VII
would limit employer liability to situations in which a supervisor acted within the scope of his
employment and could "lead to the ludicrous result that employers would become accountable
only if they explicitly require or consciously allow their supervisors to molest women employ-
ees." Id. at 151.
47. Id. at 149-50. The court pointed out that an employer's delegation of such extensive
authority gives the supervisor extreme power over the victimized employee. Id. at 150.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. The court recognized:
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An employer
should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as
affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate
sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of har-
assment under Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.
Id. at 151 n.80 (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f)).
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The court noted that the employer was the only party in a position to
halt discriminatory practices by supervisory personnel, as well as the
only entity capable of providing the equitable relief contemplated by
the act.53 The court concluded that Title VII's goal of eliminating
discrimination in employment will become an empty promise if vic-
tims of unlawful discrimination cannot secure a remedy from the only
source capable of providing it.54
The proceedings in the district court and the court of appeals
represent the two extreme views of employer liability in supervisory
hostile environment sexual harassment cases. The district court's
notice requirement would substantially limit the remedies available
to victims, while the strict liability standard adopted by the court of
appeals would result in employer liability in every case, thereby ren-
dering an inquiry into the facts of a particular case unnecessary.
B. The Supreme Court's Directive
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion 55 stated that the
record in the case was not clear enough to issue a definitive rule on
employer liability.5 It did, however, suggest that Congress wanted
courts to look to agency principles for guidance.57 The Court noted
that Congress's decision to define "employer" to include any "agent" of
an employer58 demonstrates an intent to place some limits on the acts
of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held li-
able.59 The Court, therefore, concluded that the court of appeals was
wrong to hold employers absolutely 6 liable for sexual harassment
53. Id. at 151.
54. Id.
55. The opinion began by recognizing for the first time that hostile environment sexual
harassment is a form of sex discrimination that is actionable under Title VII. Meritor, 477 U.S.
at 63-68. The opinion agreed with the court of appeals, finding that the correct inquiry is
whether the plaintiff indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether
her participation in them was voluntary. Id. at 68. See also Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114
S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993) (reaffirming that hostile work environment sexual harassment violates
Title VII). The Harris Court, however, did not address the issue of employer liability.
56. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)).
59. Id.
60. Justice Rehnquist specifically stated that
Congress' decision to define "employer" to include any "agent" of an employer, 42 U.S.C.
§2000e(b), surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for
which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible. For this reason, we hold
that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that employers are always automatically
liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors.
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committed by their supervisors.61 The Court also held, in accordance
with agency principles, that absence of notice to an employer would
not always insulate that employer from liability.6 2 Finally, the Court
held that the existence of a grievance procedure and a policy against
discrimination that went unused would not necessarily shield an
employer from liability.6 3
While refusing to provide a clear answer to the question of
employer liability for supervisory hostile environment sexual harass-
ment, the majority opinion did establish three directives for lower
courts to follow. First, the Court held that lower courts are to apply
common-law agency principles in resolving this issue. Second, the
Court rejected the absolute liability approach advocated by the court
of appeals. Finally, the Court also rejected a strict notice require-
ment, as advocated by the district court. Justice Rehnquist's opinion,
therefore, should be viewed as a compromise between the two polar
extremes advocated in the proceedings below.
Justice Marshall addressed the issue of employer liability in a
concurring opinion.6 He relied on the EEOC Guidelines 65 in
proposing that "an employer is liable if a supervisor or an agent
violates the Title VII, regardless of knowledge or any other mitigating
factor.''66 Justice Marshall pointed out that Title VII violations are
Id. (emphasis added).
While this language appears to reject the imposition of "strict liability" on employers for
supervisory hostile work environment harassment, it is interesting to note that Justice
Rhenquist did not use the legally significant terminology. Rather, the use of the words "always
automatically liable" seems to indicate that even Justice Rehnquist recognized that employers
will be liable for supervisory harassment in most cases. By not holding them "automatically
liable," the majority simply indicated that courts need to look to the facts of the case to deter-
mine whether an agency relationship exists.
This interpretation of the majority's language is consistent with the application of agency
principles advocated in this Note. See Part M. The terminology "always automatically liable,"
therefore, appears frequently throughout this Note in an effort to reflect faithfully the language
used by the majority opinion.
61. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 219-237 (1958)).
62. Id.
63. Id. The Court pointed out that these facts are relevant, but not dispositive. Id. In the
case at bar, the bank policy did not explicitly proscribe sexual harassment and it also required
an employee to complain first to her direct supervisor, in this case Taylor. Id. at 72-73. The
Court recognized that it was not surprising that Vinson did not invoke the bank's procedure in
this case. Id. at 73. However, the Court left open the possibility that if an employer's
procedures were "better calculated to encourage victims of harassment to come forward," the
procedures may effectively shield the employer from liability. Id.
64. Id. at 74 (Marshall, J., concurring).
65. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c).
66. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 75 (citing Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Adoption
of Final Interpretive Guidelines, 45 Fed. Reg. 74676, 74677 (1980) (adopting 29 C.F.R. § 1604)).
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committed by individuals. However, Title VII remedies of
reinstatement and back pay generally can be awarded only against
the employer as an entity.6 7
Justice Marshall recognized that the courts have uniformly
held employers liable, without notice, for the racial discrimination 68
and quid pro quo sexual harassment 69 of their supervisors. He found
the Solicitor General's argument" that hostile environment sexual
This Note interprets Justice Marshall's opinion to mean that a plaintiff is not required to give
notice to her employer of the supervisor's harassment to hold the employer liable. Furthermore,
since an employer is liable "regardless... of any other mitigating factor," an employer's policy
against sexual harassment and its response to the harassment should not necessarily shield it
from liability. See Part HI.E (arguing that the employer should be liable when a supervisor is
"aided in the agency relation," regardless of any remedial action taken).
67. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 75. Justice Marshall also pointed out that the remedial provisions
of Title VII were modeled after those provided by the National Labor Relations Act, id. at 75 n.1,
and federal labor law provides that the act of a supervisor is imputed to the employer, id. at 75.
He went on to argue that nothing would be gained by adopting a special rule of employer
liability for hostile environment sexual harassment. Id. at 77. Justice Marshall pointed out
that Title VII remedies provide for injunctive relief rather than money damages. Therefore, an
employer whose internal grievance procedures would have addressed the violation could avoid
this relief. Id. He also argued that when a victim seeks backpay stemming from a constructive
termination, an employer's effective internal procedure might be a factor in determining the
remedies available against it. Id. Hence, when a victim by-passed an effective grievance
procedure without a good reason, the court may be reluctant to award reinstatement and back
pay. Id. at 78.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, amended Title VII to allow victims of intentional
discrimination to recover compensatory and punitive damages, in addition to injunctive and
other equitable relief. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). Hence, even if the majority of
the Court had accepted Justice Marshall's rationale, an open question would still exist regard-
ing when a victim of sexual harassment could recover these damages from her employer.
Treatment of these issues is addressed in note 222 and Part IV.B.
68. Meitor, 477 U.S. at 75-76.
69. Id. at 76.
70. Id. The EEOC argued that a supervisor's hostile environment harassment differs from
racial discrimination and quid pro quo sexual harassment because the supervisor exercises no
actual or apparent authority in making personnel decisions regarding the victim. Id. (citing
Brief for the United States and the EEOC as Amici Curiae at 24, Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)). Hence, the EEOC concluded that in hostile environment
harassment cases notice should be required. Id.
The Reagan administration supported a notice standard. In his amicus brief to the Supreme
Court in Meritor, the Solicitor General, arguing on behalf of the EEOC, alleged that it would be
unfair to impose liability on employers who could not have known of the hostile environment
and who may have taken affirmative measures to prevent such harassment. Id. at 70-71 (citing
Brief for United States and the EEOC as Amici Curiae at 24, Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)). The Solicitor General argued that in hostile environment cases, the
usual basis for finding an agency relationship will often not exist. A supervisor who creates a
discriminatory work environment was said not to exercise or threaten to exercise actual or
apparent authority in making his personnel decisions regarding the victim. Therefore, the
Solicitor General argued for a rule that would shield an employer from liability if it had a
reasonably available avenue of complaint that, if used, was reasonably responsive to that claim.
The Solicitor General argued that if an employee did not exhaust the employer's established
complaint procedure, the employer should be absolved from liability because it did not have
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harassment should be treated differently untenable."1 By defining
employer liability more broadly in the context of a supervisor who
creates a hostile work environment, Justice Marshall aimed to treat
sexual harassment claimants the same as other victims of Title VII
discrimination. 72
Justice Marshall rejected the Solicitor General's position on
the grounds that a supervisor's authority over his subordinates ex-
tends beyond the authority to hire and fire.73 He claimed that a su-
pervisor also directs the day-to-day operations of the work place."4
Justice Marshall could conceive of no reason to treat abuse of the
latter authority delegated by the employer any differently than abuse
of the former. 5 He then noted that no such distinction appears in the
statutory language of Title VII, and that no such requirement could be
drawn from a proper application of agency law. 6 Therefore, Justice
Marshall suggested that sexual harassment by a supervisor of a sub-
ordinate employee that creates a hostile work environment should be
imputed to the employer for Title VII purposes, regardless of whether
the victim gave notice of the harassment. 7
Justice Marshall's opinion is distinct from the strict liability
approach of the court of appeals because Justice Marshall recognized
that agency principles and the goals of Title VII render some
limitations on employer liability for supervisory harassment
appropriate. 8 Justice Marshall gave the example of a supervisor with
no authority over an employee because the two work in completely
different parts of the employer's business. 9 Justice Marshall noted,
notice of the alleged sexual harassment. In all other cases, the Solicitor General argued, the
employer would be liable if it had actual knowledge of the harassment, or if the victim had no
reasonable avenue of complaint to management officials. Id.
71. Id. at 76.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. Justice Marshall stated:
In both cases it is the authority vested in the supervisor by the employer that enables
him to commit the wrong it is precisely because the supervisor is understood to be
clothed with the employer's authority that he is able to impose unwelcome sexual con-
duct on subordinates. There is therefore no justification for a special rule, to be applied
only in 'hostile environment' cases, that sexual harassment does not create employer li-
ability until the employee suffering the discrimination notifies other supervisors.
Id. at 76-77.
76. Id. at 77. See Part III of this Note for an explanation of how agency principles will
lead to employer liability in most cases.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing 29 CFR § 1604.11(c)).
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however, that these potential exceptions do not justify a general
notice requirement in hostile environment cases.80
Justice Stevens filed a brief concurring opinion in which he
joined both the majority opinion and Justice Marshall's opinion.81
Justice Stevens claimed that there was no inconsistency between the
two opinions.82 He also agreed with Justice Marshall that the issue of
employer liability was fairly presented by the record.83
In effect, Justice Stevens's view was that a proper application
of agency principles, as advocated by the majority, would lead to the
result set forth by Justice Marshall. In other words, when a supervi-
sor creates a hostile work environment for a subordinate, employer
liability will follow in most cases, with the potential for some rare
exceptions, depending upon the facts of the case. Justice Stevens's
opinion follows from both the goals of Title VII and a close examina-
tion of agency principles. The following Section of this Note tests
Justice Stevens's theory and concludes that a proper application of
agency principles leads to employer liability in nearly every case.
III. A PROPER APPLICATION OF AGENCY PRINCIPLES IN THE
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CONTEXT
Respondeat superior, the principle that holds a master liable
for the misconduct of a servant, was formulated in the days when the
servant was a member of the family or of the mercantile household.84
This close relationship continues to distinguish a servant from a non-
servant.85 Employer liability arose from the idea that the master
exercises control over the servant during the time of service. 8 Today,
with the growth of the large enterprise, the law recognizes that it
80. Id. Justice Marshall also pointed out that a notice requirement would not create a
beneficial result. Under such a requirement, an employer who did not have notice of harass-
ment would not even be required to eliminate that harassment. Justice Marshall claimed that a
better approach would hold that if the employer responded adequately upon receiving notice of
the harassment through the formal complaint mechanisms of the EEOC, it might be able to
mitigate its damages. However, the employer should still be responsible for injunctive relief,
which would presumably be a part of its "adequate response." Id. See also note 222 (discussing
the assessment of damages in hostile work environment harassment cases).
81. Id. at 73 (Stevens, J., concurring).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219, comment a (1958) ("Agency Restatement").
85. Id.
86. Id.
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would be unjust to allow an employer to profit from the intelligent
cooperation of employees without also being held responsible for their
mistakes, errors in judgment, and frailties.87 Courts, therefore, have
formulated tests that are helpful in determining whether a
relationship exists such that liability will be imposed upon the
employer for the misconduct of the employee. 88
Courts have recognized Section 219 of the Restatement of
Agency as the test of employer liability that governs in the sexual
harassment context. 9 This Section delineates the framework for
determining when a master is liable for the torts of his servants, and
provides that:
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed
while acting in the scope of their employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting out-
side the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or...
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and
there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing
the tort by the existence of the agency relation.
90
While these common-law principles may not be transferable in
all their particulars to Title VII,91 the framework of Section 219 pro-
vides adequate guidance in the supervisory sexual harassment con-
text.92 Properly analyzed, each provision in this section provides
plaintiffs with an independent avenue for imputing liability to an
employer. 93 This Note, therefore, proceeds to analyze each potential
avenue of employer liability in some detail.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See, for example, Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72 (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency §§
219-237); Bouton v. BMW of North America, Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 1994) (assessing
employer liability for a supervisor's hostile work environment sexual harassment under
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219).
90. Agency Restatement § 219 (cited in note 84).
91. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. See also Bundy, 641 F.2d at 951 (recognizing that various
agency doctrines may require some modification before they can be applied in sexual harass-
ment cases).
92. See, for example, Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Department, 916 F.2d 572, 575
(10th Cir. 1990) (analyzing employer liability for hostile environment sexual harassment under
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219); Bouton, 29 F.3d at 106 (same).
93. Section 219(2)(d) actually provides two potential avenues of employer liability. A
plaintiff may prevail on the issue of employer liability if the supervisor abused his apparent
authority, see Part III.D, or if he was aided by the agency relation in committing the harass-
ment. See Part III.E.
[Vol. 48:1057
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A Section 219(1): Scope of Employment
Section 219(1) requires the court to determine whether the
sexual harassment occurred within the course and scope of the perpe-
trator's employment and suggests a traditional respondeat superior
analysis.94 As this sub-Part explains, respondeat superior analysis is
a poor vehicle for finding employer liability for a supervisor's hostile
work environment sexual harassment.
The common-law rule provides that an assault on a third per-
son is not ordinarily within the scope of a servant's authority,95 as an
assault is usually the expression of personal hostility and is not done
with the intent of carrying out the employer's business 6 When a
servant commits an assault, he is acting for his own purposes and not
for the employer. 97 Hence, the employee alone is accountable for his
misconduct9 8 A number of courts, therefore, have held that the
doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable in cases of
harassment,99  and that employers cannot be liable for such
harassment under a scope of the employment analysis. 100
The most difficult respondeat superior cases arise when an
employee, for purely personal reasons, assaults the plaintiff in a
94. The traditional doctrine of respondeat superior holds the employer liable for employee
misconduct only when the tortfeasing employee thinks (however misguidedly) that he is doing
the employer's business in committing the wrong. See, for example, Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers
Corporation, Engine Division, 797 F.2d 1417, 1421-22 (7th Cir. 1986) (arguing that the doctrine
of respondeat superior is inapplicable to racial harassment by a co-worker).
95. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Hagenloh, 151 Tex. 191, 247 S.W.2d 236, 239 (1952).
96. Id. See also Kendall v. Whataburger, Inc., 759 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. App. 1988) (holding
that, when an employee struck a complaining customer with hot grease and a french-fry basket,
the assault could not possibly have been so connected with the employee's job so as to be within
the course and scope of his employment).
97. Texas & Pacific, 247 S.W.2d at 241 (quoting Galveston, H. & S. A Ry. Co. v. Currie,
100 Tex. 136, 96 S.W. 1073, 1074 (1906)).
98. Modern courts have been more willing to find tortious misconduct on the job within
the course and scope of employment. Vinson, 753 F.2d at 151 (citing W. Page Keeton, et al.,
Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 70 at 505-07 (West, 5th ed. 1984)). Assaults may be deemed
within the course and scope of employment when the nature of the employment requires the
employee to guard the employer's property and protect it from trespassers. Texas & Pacific, 247
S.W.2d at 239. In such a case, the use of force may be required to further the employer's
business. Id. The employer will be liable even when the guard uses more force than is
reasonably necessary. Id.
99. See note 91.
100. See Hunter, 797 F.2d at 1422. See also Salley v. Petrolane, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 61, 63
(W.D. N.C. 1991) (holding that if the alleged sexual harassment actually occurred, such acts
were performed by the employee for his own licentious intent and purpose, thus constituting a
departure from the scope of his employment and, hence, shielding the employer from liability).
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quarrel that arose out of the employment. 1 1 For example, if a pizza
delivery person collides with a plaintiff and an altercation follows, the
old rule, still in force in some jurisdictions, denies recovery.10 2 The
modern trend, however, is to allow recovery on the ground that the
employment has provided an opportunity and incentive for the loss of
temper.103
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has followed this trend by
holding that hostile environment sexual harassment may be commit-
ted within the course and scope of a supervisor's employment.'" In
Yates v. Avco Corp., the court held that in order to determine whether
a supervisor was acting within the course and scope of his employ-
ment in committing sexual harassment, it must look to "when the act
took place, where it took place, and whether it was foreseeable.'O5 The
court noted that an act may be within the scope of employment even if
it was forbidden by the employer. 06
In Yates, the court found that the harassment took place at the
employer's premises during working hours, and was carried out by a
supervisor with "authority to hire, fire, promote, and discipline" the
victims. 0 7 The court held that the harassment was clearly foresee-
able, pointing out that if it had not been, the company "would not
101. W. Page Keeton, et al, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 70 at 507 (West, 5th ed. 1984)
("Prosser and Keeton on Torts"). At least one court has labeled this situation an exception to the
scope of employment test of respondeat superior. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 996 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
102. Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 70 at 507 (citing Kuehn v. White, 24 Wash. App. 274,
600 P.2d 679 (1979); Sandman v. Hagan, 261 Iowa 560, 154 N.W.2d 113 (1967); Sheffield v.
Central Freightlines, Inc., 435 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. App. 1968); Sauter v. New York Tribune, 305
N.Y. 442, 113 N.E.2d 790 (1953)).
103. Id. (citing Johnson v. Weinberg, 434 A.2d 404 (D.C. App. 1981); Sage Club v. Hunt, 638
P.2d 161 (Wyo. 1981) (imposing liability when bartender lost temper and injured person); Scott
V. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 415 S.2d 327 (La. App. 1982) (not imposing liability for
employee's battery, committed during work, when it arose out of discussion of personal matter
consented to by employer); Prell Hotel Corp. v. Antonacci, 86 Nev. 390, 469 P.2d 399 (1970)
(imposing liability when casino employee, provoked by namecalling, struck patron); Kent v.
Bradley, 480 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. App. 1972) (holding employer liable for dispute arising over lem-
onade); Caldwell v. Farley, 134 Cal. App. 2d 84, 285 P.2d 294 (1955) (finding that assault was
committed within the scope of a union steward's employment)).
104. See Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636 (6th Cir. 1987) (discussing the responsibili-
ties involved in the supervisory role); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., Autolite Division, 970
F.2d 178, 184 (6th Cir. 1992) (considering supervisory liability).
105. 819 F.2d at 636.
106. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 217-232).
107. Id.
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have had a policy attempting to deal with it.1 °8 Therefore, agency
factors indicated that the corporate defendant should incur liability.10 9
In Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc. the Sixth Circuit articulated
a two-part test for determining whether an employer is liable for the
hostile environment sexual harassment of a supervisor."0 The court
held that, while the supervisor's harassment was within the scope of
his employment, the employer was not liable because its response to
the harassment was "prompt and adequate.""'
As developed in Yates and Kauffman, the Sixth Circuit's ap-
proach to resolving the issue of employer liability for a supervisor's
hostile environment sexual harassment is flawed in several respects.
First, it extends the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior too
far. The doctrine of respondeat superior creates employer liability
only when an employee is acting in the furtherance of his
employment. 12  It would be an unusual case in which sexual
harassment could be thought by the perpetrator to further the
employer's business."3 It is more accurate to view sexual harassment
as an act performed by its perpetrator "for his own licentious intent
and purpose, thus constituting a departure from the scope of [his]
employment.""1
Second, by allowing an employer to negate its liability by ade-
quate and effective remedial action," 5 the court strays further from a
true application of respondeat superior. Under respondeat superior,
108. Id.
109. Id. While the court indicated that employer liability could be negated if the employer
had an effective policy or responded adequately and effectively once it had notice of the harass-
ment, it held that, in this case, Avco did not satisfy either criteria. Id.
110. Employer liability "depends on 1) whether [the supervisor's] harassing actions were
foreseeable or fell within his scope of employment and 2) even if they were, whether [the
employer] responded adequately and effectively to negate liability." Kauffman, 970 F.2d at 184.
111. Id. As soon as the plaintiffs union representative informed the Director of Employee
Relations about the supervisor's harassment, the management immediately confronted the
supervisor and fired him. Id. at 185.
112. Hunter, 797 F.2d at 1421. See also Barnes, 561 F.2d at 996 (MacYinnon, J., concur-
ring) (stating that while an employer provided its supervisor with an opportunity to commit
harassment by agency, this opportunity was no greater than would be afforded by any employ-
ment setting, and thus could not be said to create an "incentive" for such conduct).
113. Hunter, 797 F.2d at 1422.
114. Salley, 764 F. Supp. at 63. See notes 94-100 and accompanying text (describing a
theory that assault does not fall within the scope of a servant's authority). While factors such as
when sexual harassment took place, its location, and whether it was foreseeable are relevant in
determining whether a supervisor was aided by the agency relation in creating a hostile work
environment, this analysis is more properly characterized as an agency analysis. The Sixth
Circuit, therefore, incorrectly describes this principle as an application of respondeat superior.
See Part HI.E.
115. Kauffman, 970 F.2d at 184.
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an employer is liable for the misconduct of its servant even though the
employer has not authorized, or has expressly prohibited such
conduct.116 Hence, an employment policy prohibiting sexual har-
assment in the workplace would not shield the employer from liabil-
ity. Remedial action by the employer upon notice of the harassment
may be sufficient to mitigate damages under respondeat superior, but
it should not entirely absolve the employer from liability for its ser-
vant's misconduct. 117
On its face, the Sixth Circuit test includes a rather lenient
standard for finding sexual harassment within the scope of employ-
ment. However, by allowing the employer to negate liability with an
effective policy against harassment and an adequate response to the
harassment, the court fails to apply the common-law doctrine of re-
spondeat superior in its true sense. In a correct application of the
doctrine, once it is determined that the supervisor's action was within
the scope of his employment, the employer would be liable regardless
of whether the conduct was forbidden (i.e., by a policy prohibiting
harassment), and regardless of the employer's response upon notice.
The court, therefore, really applied a negligence standard and deter-
mined whether the supervisor acted with apparent authority.118
Finally, the Sixth Circuit's approach fails to examine all of the
potential avenues of employer liability available to the plaintiff under
Section 219. The Meritor framework demands a proper analysis of
each provision under Section 219 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, and Section 219(2) specifically provides that an employer may
be liable for its servant's actions even though the servant was not
acting within the scope of his employment."9
By limiting employer liability to the misconduct of its supervi-
sors committed within the scope of their employment, the Sixth
Circuit ignores the agency principles embodied by Section 219(2).
Furthermore, by allowing the employer to negate liability upon a
showing of an effective policy against harassment or adequate reme-
dial action, the Sixth Circuit's approach is not consistent with the
common law doctrine of respondeat superior. 20
116. Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 70 at 506 (cited in note 101).
117. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 77-78 (Marshall, J., concurring).
118. See Parts III.C and D.
119. Agency Restatement § 219(2) (cited in note 84).
120. In fact, the Sixth Circuit's approach "could lead to the ludicrous result that employers
would become accountable only if they explicitly require or consciously allow their supervisors
to molest women employees." Vinson, 753 F.2d at 151 (citing Significant Development, New
[Vol. 48:10571076
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B. Section 219(2)(a): Master Intended the Conduct
or Its Consequences
The misuse of terminology in assessing employer liability is a
source of confusion in the appellate courts. A number of circuit courts
have held that in order to establish a prima facie case of hostile work
environment sexual harassment a plaintiff must prove respondeat
superior.121 However, respondeat superior is a common-law doctrine
that holds employers liable only when their servant is acting within
the course and scope of his employment. Agency principles, on the
other hand, are broader in scope because they hold employers liable,
in certain circumstances, for an agent's misconduct that is committed
outside the scope of employment.122 In following Meritor's mandate to
use agency principles for guidance in determining when an employer
should be liable for its supervisor's hostile work environment
harassment, 23 lower courts should dispense with the element of
respondeat superior, and instead look to the broader avenues of
liability available under common-law agency principles. 12 4
In a proper application of agency principles, courts look beyond
whether the supervisor acted within the course and scope of employ-
ment by focusing on Section 219(2).125 Section 219(2)(a) is distinct
from Section 219(1) in that it focuses on the conduct of the em-
ployer,26 rather than on the mental state of the employee committing
the misconduct. It provides that an employer is liable for the conse-
quences of an employee's conduct that result from the employer's
directions.127
EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment
Under Title VII, 61 B.U. L. Rev. 535, 539 (1981)).
121. Henson, 682 F.2d at 905.
122. Agency Restatement § 219(2) (cited in note 84).
123. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
124. See also note 135 (explaining the difference between respondeat superior and agency
principles).
125. See Agency Restatement § 219, comment e (cited in note 84) (stating that Section
219(2) "enumerates the situations in which a master may be liable for torts of servants acting
solely for their own purposes and hence not in the scope of employment").
126. Agency Restatement § 219 provides that the first three categories of subsection (2)
articulate situations in which the employer is guilty of tortious conduct.
127. Agency Restatement § 212 provides:
A person is subject to liability for the consequences of another's conduct which results
from his directions as he would be for his own personal conduct if, with knowledge of the
conditions, he intends the conduct, or if he intends its consequences, unless the one
directing or the one acting has a privilege or immunity not available to the other.
10771995]
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In the sexual harassment context, the inquiry under Section
219(2)(a) should focus on whether the employer directed the employee
to commit the wrong,128 or whether the employer subsequently ratified
the conduct. 2 9 Independently, Section 219(2)(a) provides scant assis-
tance in establishing employer liability for hostile environment sexual
harassment. First, there are few situations in which a victim of har-
assment would be able to prove that the employer intended the sexual
harassment to occur. 130 An employer's policy against sexual harass-
ment in the workplace provides sufficient evidence to negate this
possibility. Secondly, if a plaintiff is able to satisfy Section 219(2)(a),
she will also be able to show either that the supervisor was acting
within the course and scope of his employment,13' or that the employer
was negligent.132 These showings, in themselves, are sufficient to
confer liability to the employer. 33
C. Section 219(2)(b): Negligence
Under common-law principles of agency, a principal who con-
ducts an activity through its employees is subject to liability for harm
resulting from the employee's conduct if the employer is negligent or
reckless.'3 All of the circuit courts have, explicitly or implicitly, ex-
128. See, for example, Clemmons v. Life Insurance Company of Georgia, 274 N.C. 416, 163
S.E.2d 761, 766 (1968) (holding employer liable if it expressly or implicitly authorizes the
employee's misconduct); Salley, 764 F. Supp. at 63 (establishing employer liability "when the
agent's act is expressly authorized by the principal").
129. See, for example, Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 79 N.C. App. 483, 340 S.E.2d
116, 122 (1986) (holding that employer is liable for supervisor's sexual harassment if plaintiff is
able to prove "that the employer had knowledge of all material facts and circumstances relative
to the wrongful act, and that the employer, by words or conduct, shows an intention to ratify the
act"); Salley, 764 F. Supp. at 63 (holding employers liable "when the agent's act is ratified by the
principal").
130. See note 120 and accompanying text.
131. If an employer directs a supervisor to engage in sexual harassment and the supervisor
obliges, he will be acting to further the employer's business. See Part IIlA (discussing scope of
the employment).
132. This will be the case when the employer ratifies the conduct, i.e., when the employer
knew of the harassment and failed to adequately respond to it. See Part III.C.
133. See Part IIIA (discussing scope of employment); Part 1I.C (discussing negligence).
134. Agency Restatement § 219(2)(b) (cited in note 84). The Agency Restatement § 213
provides:
A person conducting an activity through servants or other agents is subject to liability
for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless: (a) in giving improper
or ambiguous orders of [sic] in failing to make proper regulations; or (b) in the
employment of improper persons or instrumentalities in work involving risk of harm to
others; or (c) in the supervision of the activity; or (d) in permitting, or failing to prevent,
negligent or other tortious conduct by persons, whether or not his servants or agents,
upon premises or with instrumentalities under his control.
1078
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tended their employer liability analysis to Section 219(2)(b) by impos-
ing liability on employers that knew or should have known of hostile
work environment sexual harassment, but nonetheless failed to take
appropriate action.13 5 The Meritor Court referred to this standard as
The employer can be negligent in a variety of ways. First, it can be negligent in giving
directions by not anticipating dangerous circumstances which are "likely to arise" in the work-
place. Id., comment c. Second, the epnployer may be negligent by failing to exercise due care in
selecting an agent to perform its work. Id., comment d. See Quinonez on Behalf of Quinonez v.
Anderson, 144 Ariz. 193, 696 P.2d 1342, 1346 (App. 1984) (holding that the trial court erred in
dismissing a negligent entrustment count merely because liability based on respondeat superior
was admitted, and ruling that the jury should have considered the employer's alleged negligence
in hiring an incompetent driver). Agency Restatement § 213, comment d also provides that "if a
principal, without exercising due care in selection, employs a vicious person to do an act which
necessarily brings him in contact with others while in the performance of a duty, he is subject to
liability for harm caused by the vicious propensity."
Third, comment f explains that the negligence of an employer may consist of a failure to use
due care in inspecting the premises upon which employees work, or a failure to supervise its
employees' conduct. Id., comment f. This comment further provides that "an employer] is
under a continuous duty of inspection and repair and is required to give such attention to the
business, or to see that it is given, as will normally guard against injuries to third persons." Id.
(citing §§ 492-520). See Anderson v. Hall, 755 F. Supp. 2, 5 (D. D.C. 1991) (holding that a client
stated a cognizable legal claim when he sued the partners of a law firm for negligence, alleging
that their failure to properly supervise an associate resulted in the dismissal of the client's tort
claim).
An employer may also be negligent for failing to provide reasonably necessary regulations
that prevent risk of harm from the conduct of those working under him. Agency Restatement §
213, comment g also provides: "One who engages in an enterprise is under a duty to anticipate
and to guard against the human traits of his employees which unless regulated are likely to
harm others."
Finally, an employer is subject to liability for acquiescing in, or ratifying tortious conduct.
Id., comment i. This section provides:
A master is subject to liability as the possessor of premises for conduct of a servant
thereon, or in fact the conduct of anyone, to the continuance of which he consents after
he knows or should know that such conduct contains an unreasonable risk of harm to
licensees or those upon adjacent roads or premises .... If, however, being in control of
the premises and of the persons acting by the fact that he is their principal or master, he
does not object to dangerous conduct, his inaction may cause him to be liable to persons
harmed by it.
See Buchanan v. Stanships, Inc., 744 F.2d 1070, 1075-76 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that if the
owner or operator of a vessel failed to conform its employees' conduct to the company rules
against rendering passage and that conduct amounted to a customary practice in which the
owner or operator implicitly acquiesced, then it should be held liable for harm resulting from
the dangerous conduct of its employees).
135. See, for example, Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 901 (holding that in a Title IX case, an educa-
tional institution is liable for the hostile environment sexual harassment of its supervisors if an
official representing that institution knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
known, of the harassment's occurrence, unless that official took appropriate remedial action);
Bouton v. BMW of North America, Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 107 (3rd Cir. 1994) (noting that appellate
courts readily accept the negligence concept of § 219(2)(b) if the harassment is reported to the
employer, and the employer fails to take prompt and effective remedial action).
See also Flagship, 793 F.2d at 719-20 (holding that in order to establish a claim against an
employer for a supervisor's hostile work environment sexual harassment, the plaintiff must
show that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to
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a notice requirement. 136 By failing to respond adequately to notice of
harassment, an employer engages in negligent or reckless behavior. 137
In order to prevail under this standard, a plaintiff must establish two
elements of her claim. First, she must establish that the employer
had actual or constructive knowledge of the hostile work environ-
ment.1" 8 Second, she must establish that the employer did not ade-
quately respond to notice of the harassment.139
take prompt remedial action). The Flagship court erred by labeling its requirement of notice
respondeat superior. At common law, respondeat superior was used to determine when a
master was liable for the torts of his servant. This was limited to an inquiry regarding whether
the servant was acting within the course and scope of employment. In contrast, agency
principles were analyzed to determine when a principal should be liable for the torts of a
servant, technically a broader inquiry. Therefore, when the Fifth Circuit directed lower courts
to ask whether an employer responded adequately to notice of sexual harassment, it directed
them to make a determination regarding whether the employer should be held vicariously liable
as an agent, not whether the plaintiff has proven respondeat superior. See also Part III.B
(discussing courts' confusion regarding the distinction between agency principles and
respondeat superior); Hunter, 797 F.2d at 1421-22 (explaining the difference between derivative
liability for respondeat superior and direct liabilty for negligence or recklessness); Guess v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1990) (lamenting that "some of the cases
have created potential confusion by calling the standard of employer liability that they endorse
a form of respondeat superior" and recognizing that "the problem is merely a semantic one").
136. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70 (discussing petitioner's and Solicitor General's argument
for a requirement of notice to the employer).
137. See, for example, Bouton, 29 F.3d at 107 (pointing out that appellate courts have
readily accepted the negligence concept of § 219(2)(b) in hostile environment sexual harassment
cases).
138. See note 134 and the accompanying text.
139. Id. Some circuit courts have read negligence principles narrowly to impose a strict
notice requirement on plaintiffs seeking recovery for the hostile work environment harassment
of a supervisor. In Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 900 (1st Cir. 1988), for
example, the First Circuit determined that the "gist" of Meritor's holding was that a court
should not apply strict agency principles, but rather should use them as "guidance." Id.
Emphasizing Meritor's directive that employers are not always automatically liable, the court
concluded that an employer would incur liability only if it had notice of the sexual harassment
and failed to respond adequately. Id. at 900-01.
The First Circuit's strict notice requirement ignores the Meritor holding that "absence of
notice to an employer does not necessarily insulate that employer from liability." Meritor, 477
U.S. at 72. See also Flagship, 793 F.2d at 719-20 (holding that in order to establish a claim
against an employer for a hostile work environment, the plaintiff must show that the employer
knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial
action). In keeping with the Court's directive in Meritor, those courts applying the common-law
agency principle of negligence to hostile work environment sexual harassment by a supervisor
can and should provide for a broader base of liability than that which would result from the
application of a strict notice requirement. This sub-Part suggests several avenues by which
courts may use the agency principles of negligence embodied by Section 219(2)(b) to achieve this
broader base of liability.
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1. Actual Knowledge
To establish actual knowledge, the plaintiff may show that she
followed an established grievance procedure or that management
knew of the hostile environment through informal channels.140 In
addition, at least one court has imputed knowledge of a hostile envi-
ronment to the employer by virtue of the fact that the perpetrator of
the harassment was positioned sufficiently high in the corporate
hierarchy. In Burns v. McGregor Electronic Industries, Inc.,141 the
Eighth Circuit applied the notice requirement42 and determined that
the employer had actual knowledge of the hostile environment be-
cause the perpetrator of the harassment was the owner of the com-
pany.143 While the Burns court recognized that harassment commit-
ted by someone high enough in the company hierarchy could consti-
tfute knowledge to the employer, it did not specify how far down the
hierarchy this knowledge would extend. The Burns court thus left
open the question of whether harassment committed by a supervisor
would also constitute actual knowledge to the employer.'"
When a supervisor commits hostile environment sexual har-
assment, actual knowledge of the harassment should be imputed to
the employer.145 A contrary holding creates an anomalous situation.
If, for example, a woman is sexually harassed by a co-worker, reports
the harassment to her supervisor, and her supervisor fails to respond,
140. See, for example, Kopp v. Samaritan Health System, Inc., 13 F.3d 264, 269-70 (8th Cir.
1993) (imputing knowledge to the employer when the alleged harasser's conduct was the
frequent subject of discussion at management meetings, employees filed a report about his
conduct and complained to their supervisors about it, and his conduct was "common knowledge"
among members of the management team).
141. 955 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1992).
142. Id. at 564.
143. Id.
144. The district court in Meritor rejected the argument that sexual harassment committed
by a supervisor constitutes actual knowledge to the employer. Vinson, 23 FEP Cases at 41-42.
The court relied on the fact that Taylor did not have the authority to hire, fire, or promote and
therefore did not occupy a sufficiently high position in the corporate hierarchy. Id. at 42. The
district court's reasoning, however, is unpersuasive. Under Section 219(2)(b), an employer can
be held liable for either a failure to supervise the conduct of individuals whom it employs or a
failure to use due care in hiring an employee whom it puts in contact with others. See note 134
and accompanying text. These potential avenues of employer liability do not depend upon the
employer granting the employee who commits the misconduct the authority to hire, fire, or
promote.
145. But see Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 64 (2nd Cir.
1992) (recognizing that at some point the actions of a supervisor at a sufficiently high level in
the hierarchy would necessarily be imputed to the company, but holding that a case involving a
manager's hostile environment harassment did not present such a situation).
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the employer would be liable. If, however, the same supervisor is the
perpetrator of the harassment, the employer would not be held liable,
unless another supervisor knew or should have known of the harass-
ment and failed to take adequate remedial action. It makes no sense
to hold an employer liable for sexual harassment that a supervisor
discovers, but not for the sexual harassment that the supervisor
commits.
Title VII's definition of "employer" lends further support for
imputing actual knowledge of a hostile work environment created by
a supervisor to the employer.146 This definition of employer, which
includes supervisors by virtue of their status as agents, equates
supervisor knowledge with employer knowledge, suggesting that
employers should be directly liable for the misconduct of their
supervisors. 147 This is essentially the position Justice Marshall took
in rejecting a notice requirement in his concurring opinion in
Meritor.148
Such an interpretation of the actual knowledge requirement
would create an incentive for employers to educate their supervisors
about behavior that might constitute sexual harassment and would
encourage employers to monitor the workforce more closely to ensure
that a hostile environment did not exist. It would also remove the
incentive for employers to look the other way when they suspect the
existence of sexual harassment. Imputing the supervisor's knowledge
to his employer would thus offer the greatest opportunity to prevent
harassment from occurring in the first instance.
2. Constructive Knowledge
While no court has adopted the expansive theory of actual
knowledge described above, some of the circuits have adopted a
broader interpretation of the alternative requirement of constructive
knowledge. In EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel,149 the Ninth Circuit found
that the employer had actual knowledge of the hostile environment
146. The Act defines the term "employer" as a "person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce... and any agent of such a person...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
147. The Tenth Circuit recognized that "[u]nder Title VII an 'employer' is directly liable for
... sexual harassment of its employees." Sparks, 830 F.2d at 1557-58 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c)). "Thus, where the harasser is plaintiff's 'employer'. . . plaintiff
need not establish that she gave anyone notice of the harassment." Id. at 1558.
148. 477 U.S. at 76-78 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also notes 64 to 80 and accompanying
text.
149. 881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1989).
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sexual harassment. 150 The court pointed out, however, that even ab-
sent this actual knowledge, the employer had constructive knowledge
of the harassment because it was severe and pervasive and "seriously
tainted" the plaintiffs working environment.15' Since hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment is "severe or pervasive" by definition, 52 a
literal reading of the court's language in Hacienda suggests that
whenever a hostile environment exists, the employer should be
charged with constructive knowledge.
Imputing constructive knowledge to an employer whose super-
visor creates a hostile work environment results in a sound applica-
tion of common-law negligence principles as embodied by Section
219(2)(b), as well as advancement of the public policies underlying
Title VII. First, an employer that fails to discover harassment by its
supervisor that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile
work environment violates its continuous duty to guard against inju-
ries to third persons in the workplace. 53
Second, holding employers to constructive knowledge of a
supervisor's severe or pervasive harassment would also advance the
goals of Title VII by encouraging employers to closely monitor the
workplace for hostile work environments. If an employer knows that
it will not incur liability unless the plaintiff proves actual knowledge,
it has a strong incentive to look the other way when evidence of har-
assment arises. If employers know that they will be held to construc-
tive knowledge of a hostile work environment in their workplace,
however, they will make affirmative efforts to determine whether
such harassment exists to provide a prompt remedy and thereby miti-
gate the damages that they might otherwise incur.
Third, it is fair to employers to hold them liable for construc-
tive knowledge of a hostile work environment. The severe and perva-
sive standard constitutes a difficult burden for plaintiffs, who will
therefore satisfy it only in cases of especially egregious harassment.
In those cases, any employer that uses due care in monitoring its
workplace for circumstances likely to cause injuries to third persons
will have known or at least should have known of the harassment.'5
150. Id. at 1516.
151. Id.
152. Sparks, 830 F.2d at 1557.
153. Agency Restatement § 213, comment f (cited in note 84).
154. It is ironic that proponents of a strict notice requirement who worry about the equity
of holding employers liable for harassment unless they had actual knowledge of the hostile work
environment generally concede that employers should be strictly liable for quid pro quo harass-
1995] 1083
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A knowledge requirement would not necessarily eliminate
Title VII liability, as has been suggested.155 Plaintiffs may prove
actual knowledge if the court imputes to employers the knowledge of a
supervisor who creates a hostile environment. In addition, if the
court imputes constructive knowledge to employers in cases of severe
and pervasive supervisory harassment, a victim of harassment may
show constructive knowledge whenever a hostile work environment
exits.
While this analysis of the knowledge requirement will assure
that an employer's knowledge of a supervisor's hostile work environ-
ment harassment is achieved in every case, it does not fall within the
Meritor prohibition against holding employers always automatically
liable in every case of supervisory harassment. Under strict liability,
an employer would be liable for supervisory harassment regardless of
any remedial action taken. Under the negligence avenue of liability
provided by agency law, however, an employer may negate its liabil-
ity, or at least mitigate its damages, by responding adequately and
appropriately to the harassment.
3. Adequate Response
Under Section 219(2)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, once a plaintiff demonstrates actual or constructive knowl-
edge of the employer, the court will then determine whether the
employer's response to the harassment was reasonably prompt and
responsive. 156 This issue constitutes a question of fact.57 To qualify
as an adequate response, the employer's remedial action must be
"reasonably calculated to end the harassment."'1 This standard does
not necessarily require the employer to discharge or demote the har-
asser in every case.'5 9 While egregious cases may demand such action,
ment. Intuitively, it seems far more likely that an employer would know about harassment that
is so severe or pervasive as to create a hostile work environment than they would when quid pro
quo harassment is committed by a supervisor who discretely tells a female employee that she
will be fired for not sleeping with him, or promoted if she does.
155. Agency Restatement § 219(2)(b) (cited in note 84). See Vinson, 753 F.2d at 151-52.
156. Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 106 (4th Cir. 1989), on rehearing rev'd in part,
900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990).
157. Id.
158. Katz, 709 F.2d at 256.
159. Hirschfeld, 916 F.2d at 578 n.6.
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in less serious cases, a reprimand, brief suspension, or other remedial
steps may be sufficient to remedy the situation.160
If the employer's remedial action constitutes nothing more
than a slap on the wrist or an outright sham, however, the court will
find the response insufficient and will hold the employer liable under
a negligence theory.16 For example, if the remedy imposed increases
the victim's exposure to the harasser, or if previous remedies of a
similar nature have failed to deter the harasser from striking again,
such evidence will cast doubt on the adequacy of the remedies. 62
Furthermore, if management personnel do not take allegations of
harassment seriously, the employer will incur liability for negli-
gence. 163 Finally, some courts have held that a plaintiff may provide
evidence of negligence by showing that an employer failed to have in
place well-publicized and enforced anti-harassment policies, effective
formal and informal complaint structures, training, and monitoring
mechanisms.'6
When a supervisor creates a hostile environment and is the
only management-level employee with knowledge of the harassment,
one could argue that it would be difficult for the employer to take
prompt and adequate remedial steps to negate the liability.
160. Id. See also Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Ind., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989)
(holding that reprimand of harasser and assurance to employees that harassment would stop
constituted prompt remedial action); Swentek v. USAir Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 558 (4th Cir. 1987)
(holding that a letter of warning, verbal reprimand, and threat that employee would be sus-
pended if further complaints were filed constituted prompt and adequate remedial action).
161. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 107.
162. Id. at 106-07.
163. Id. at 107.
164. In Lehmann v. Toys V' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 626 A.2d 445, 463 (1993), the Supreme
Court of New Jersey held that under its state version of Title VII the presence of such mecha-
nisms would not be outcome determinative of whether an employer incurred liability for negli-
gence in a sexual harassment case. Id. However, the court then stated that it would accept
effective preventive mechanisms as evidence of the exercise of due care by the employer. Id. It
explained that evidence shows that the sincere and effective implementation of five elements is
successful at surfacing sexual harassment claims before they escalate. These five elements
include policies, formal and informal complaint structures, mandatory training, effective moni-
toring mechanisms, and finally, "an unequivocal commitment from the top that is not just in
words but backed up by consistent practice." Id. (quoting The Civil Rights Act of 1991:
Hearings on H.R. 1 before the House Committee on Education and Labor, 102nd Cong., 1st
Sess. 168, 171 (1991) (statement of Dr. Freada Klein)). The Lehman court's framework for
preventing sexual harassment is consistent with common-law principles of agency. See Agency
Restatement § 213, comment g (cited in note 84), which provides:
A master is negligent if he fails to use care to provide such regulations as are reasonably
necessary to prevent undue risk or harm to third persons or to other servants from the
conduct of those working under him.... One who engages in an enterprise is under a
duty to anticipate and to guard against the human traits of his employees which unless
regulated are likely to harm others.
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Ignorance of a supervisor's harassment, however, does not prevent an
employer from establishing the aforementioned prevention mecha-
nisms. Moreover, if management has acted reasonably and responsi-
bly and harassment still occurs, the court can take this into account
in determining the proper remedy.
In assessing a proper remedy, a court should impose injunctive
relief upon a negligent employer. Such a remedy advances the pur-
poses of Title VII by eliminating a specific instance of discrimination
from a place of employment. An employer can avoid injunctive relief
by employing remedial procedures after receiving notice of a
complaint from the EEOC.165 Likewise, when a victim of harassment
without good reason bypasses an internal complaint procedure she
knows to be effective, a court may refuse to award other remedies
such as reinstatement, backpay, compensatory relief, and punitive
damages. 16
Assessing damages under a negligence theory of employer
liability thus gives courts flexibility in determining appropriate dam-
ages based on the facts of each case. By considering such factors as
the employer's policies for dealing with sexual harassment, its past
record in this regard, and any other preventive measures the company
may have adopted, 67 courts encourage employers to do everything
within their power to prevent harassment and remedy it as soon as
possible16s Furthermore, this approach ensures that employers will
take steps to eliminate any existing hostile environment and also
ensures that victims of harassment will receive appropriate relief.
165. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 77 (Marshall, J., concurring).
166. Id.
167. The EEOC Guidelines emphasize that:
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An employer
should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as
affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate
sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the -issue of
harassment under Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f). See also, Paroline, 879 F.2d at 107 (holding that it would "impute
liability to an employer who anticipated or reasonably should have anticipated that the plaintiff
would become a victim of sexual harassment in the workplace and yet failed to take action
reasonably calculated to prevent such harassment").
168. Catharine MacKinnon and Patricia Berry argued that preventive mechanisms work.
"If procedures are viable and do not denigrate the victim, they will be used." Respondents Brief
at 38 (cited in note 9).
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D. Section 219(2)(d)(cl. 1): Apparent Authority
While a negligence theory is one way in which employers may
be liable for the hostile environment sexual harassment of its supervi-
sors,169 a proper application of agency principles requires a court to
look beyond this potential avenue of liability to other sources provided
by Section (219)(2)(d) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency. Under
this provision, an employer is liable for conduct that is within the
apparent authority of a servant.170 In order to recover under this
theory a plaintiff must show that the employer manifested in its
agent the authority to act on its behalf,171 that such manifestation
resulted in harm to the plaintiff,172 and that the plaintiff acted or
relied on the apparent authority in some way.7 3 An employee
satisfying these elements may recover damages for harm caused by
her reasonable reliance upon the representations of one acting within
his apparent authority. 74 The motive of the employee acting within
his apparent authority is generally irrelevant.175
169. While application of the agency principle of negligence advocated in the preceding dis-
cussion, Part HI.C, will lead to employer liability in a number of cases, limiting the employer
liability analysis to this basis is insufficient. First, most circuit courts apply negligence princi-
ples in a more restrictive manner than is advocated here. See, for example, note 139 (citing
examples of unduly restrictive applications of the negligence avenue of employer liability).
Second, in many cases, under negligence principles, employers will be able to negate liability by
showing that they reponded adequately to knowledge of a hostile work environment. See Part
III.C. Likewise, under an apparent authority analysis, an employer will be able to negate its
liability upon a showing that it removed any reasonable inference that its supervisor could
create a hostile work environment with impunity, i.e., by establishing a well-articulated policy
against such harassment. Part BID. If a supervisor is aided by the agency relation in
committing the harassment, however, the employer will not be able to negate its liability by a
showing of a policy against such harassment and an adequate response to such harassment once
it becomes known. Nonetheless, such showings may be used by an employer to mitigate its
damages. See Part HI.E.
170. Agency Restatement § 219(2)(d) (cited in note 84). Agency Restatement § 265 sets
forth the general rule regarding apparent authority:
(1) A master or other principal is subject to liability for torts which result from
reliance upon, or belief in, statements or other conduct within an agent's apparent
authority.
(2) Unless there has been reliance, the principal is not liable in tort for conduct of a
servant or other agent merely because it is within his apparent authority or apparent
scope of employment.
171. Agency Restatement § 265, comment a.
172. Id.
173. Id., comment b.
174. Agency Restatement § 266 provides: "A purported master or other principal is subject
to liability for physical harm caused to others or to their belongings by their reasonable reliance
upon the tortious representations of one acting within his apparent authority or apparent scope
of employment."
175. Agency Restatement § 265, comment a.
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If a supervisor relies on his apparent authority to create the
hostile work environment, his employer should be held liable under
Section 219(2)(d). A supervisor's power extends beyond the ability to
hire, fire, promote, or discipline employees. 176 Supervisors are also
charged with authority over other important aspects of the workplace
such as its day-to-day supervision and overall safety and productiv-
ity.17 In other words, a supervisor is charged with monitoring and
controlling the work environment. The understanding that the su-
pervisor is granted authority from the employer enables him to im-
pose unwelcome sexual conduct on his subordinates. 178 There is no
reason why abuse of one type of authority should have different con-
sequences than abuse of the other.7 9 In both situations, the authority
vested in the supervisor enables him to commit the harassment.
In Watts v. New York City Police Dept., 80 the District Court for
the Southern District of New York employed the doctrine of apparent
authority to hold that an employee pleaded sufficient facts to state a
hostile environment claim against her employer.' 8' The court recog-
nized that a supervisor's sexual harassment of an employee, under-
taken for the supervisor's own purposes, is likely to be outside the
scope of employment.82 Nevertheless, it held that if the supervisor
accomplishes this conduct through means furnished to him by his
employer, for example, through influence or control over hiring, job
performance evaluations, work assignments, or promotions, and the
employer has not put in place strong policies and procedures that
effectively eliminate the apparent authority, agency law will hold the
employer liable as the source of the abused apparent authority.183
This is true even if the employer is without notice.84
Likewise, in Bouton v. BMW of North America, Inc.,85s the
Third Circuit recognized that a supervisor's position of power over the
victim can aid him in his harassment, thereby constituting an abuse
of apparent authority. 86 The court held, however, that the victim's
176. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 76 (Marshall, J., concurring).
177. Id.
178. See id. at 77 (stating that "it is precisely because the supervisor is clothed with the
employer's authority that he is able to impose unwelcome sexual conduct on subordinates").
179. Id. at 76.
180. 724 F. Supp. 99 (S.D. N.Y. 1989).
181. Id. at 110.
182. Id. at 106 n.6.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 29 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 1994).
186. Id. at 108.
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belief in her supervisor's apparent authority must be reasonable be-
fore her employer would be held liable.187 The court concluded that
this particular victim did not believe that her supervisor's misconduct
was company policy because she also believed that she could achieve a
remedy by speaking to her harasser's boss.188 The court also held that
the absence of a formal written grievance policy regarding sexual
harassment was not dispositive.189
The Watts and Bouton courts properly applied agency princi-
ples to confer liability on an employer whose supervisor abused his
apparent authority to create a hostile work environment. The cases
properly held that liability should attach under the doctrine of appar-
ent authority regardless of whether an employer had knowledge of the
harassment and hence, even when the employer was not negligent.
However, the plaintiff must also prove that the supervisor was acting
on the employer's behalf, that his conduct resulted in harm to the
plaintiff, and she reasonably acted or relied upon his apparent
authority.190
Whenever an employer vests its supervisor with the authority
to control significant aspects of the work environment, the employer
authorizes the supervisor to act on its behalf, thereby meeting the
first requirement of the common-law doctrine of apparent authority.
Showing that the victim suffered harm as a result of the supervisor's
abuse of his apparent authority merely requires the victim to show
that she was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment. The victim
will meet this requirement whenever she is able to prove that a hos-
tile work environment existed.
Of the three elements necessary to show apparent authority,
the victim of harassment will have the greatest difficulty proving that
she acted or relied on the apparent authority of her supervisor. The
Third Circuit interpreted this element to require that the victim's
belief in her supervisor's apparent authority be reasonable. 191 While
the Third Circuit properly required the victim to prove reliance on her
supervisor's apparent authority, it erred in holding that the em-
187. Id. at 109.
188. Id. at 108.
189. Id. at 109.
190. See notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
191. Bouton, 29 F.3d at 109.
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ployer's lack of a formal written grievance policy was not dispositive
of that issue.192
When an employer lacks a formal written grievance policy, a
victim of sexual harassment will reasonably perceive her only avail-
able options to be silently acquiescing in the harassment or leaving
her job. One of the goals of Title VII should be to ensure that the
victim of discriminatory conduct is given a feasible third choice,
namely enforcing an effective grievance procedure that outlaws sexual
harassment while continuing in her employment. 193
This goal would be furthered by a rule providing that in order
to shield itself from liability for a supervisor's abuse of his apparent
authority, an employer must take firm steps to remove any possible
inference that a supervisor has authority to sexually harass his sub-
ordinates.94 As the Southern District of New York held, these steps
should include a written policy prohibiting such harassment. 95 The
policy should be publicized and effectively implemented so that each
employee is made aware that such conduct will not be tolerated. An
employer should not escape liability because of a procedure if that
procedure proves inadequate. 96 This application of the apparent
authority doctrine provides the best incentive mechanism to ensure
that employers strip their supervisors of any perceived authority to
create a hostile work environment, and will encourage employers to
create, implement, and enforce effective policies outlawing discrimi-
nation in employment.
192. See note 167 (quoting the EEOC Guidelines that encourage prevention of
harassment).
193. See note 14 (arguing that a victim of harassment who is forced to leave her job or put
up with the harassment suffers ajob detriment).
194. If the employer has not provided an effective avenue for complaint, then the
supervisor
has unchecked, final control over the victim and it is reasonable to impute his abuse of
his power to the employer. The Commission generally will find an employer liable for
'hostile environment' sexual harassment by a supervisor when the employer failed to
establish an explicit policy against sexual harassment and did not have a reasonably
available avenue by which victims of sexual harassment could complain to someone with
authority to investigate and remedy the problem.
EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 8 Labor Rel. Rptr. (BNA) 405.6697 (1990)
(citation omitted). In either of these situations, a reasonable inference could be drawn that the
supervisor's illicit conduct was tacitly approved by management, thus creating liability under
Agency Restatement § 219(2)(d) (cited in note 84). Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 464.
195. Watts, 724 F. Supp. at 106 n.6.
196. Respondent's Brief at 38 (cited in note 9).
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E. Section 219(2)(d)(cl. 2): Supervisor Aided by the Agency Relation
Section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement of Agency recognizes that
an employee's position as an agent may enable him to cause harm.197
In the sexual harassment context, the second clause of Section
219(2)(d) suggests that if an employer delegates the authority to con-
trol the work environment to a supervisor who then abuses that
delegated authority, employer liability will follow.198 While also
justified on the abused authority rationale, this inquiry should be
distinct from the apparent authority analysis.199 Even if an employer
successfully negates any apparent authority the supervisor might
have had to commit sexual harassment, a supervisor still holds actual
power over his subordinates in the workplace. If the supervisor is
able to misuse that power to create a hostile work environment, the
employer will be liable for having placed him in the position to do
S0.2oo
197. Agency Restatement § 219, comment e (cited in note 84). Section 219(2)(d) recognizes
that an employee may be able to cause harm because of his position as an agent. For example,
at common law, an employer is liable when a telegraph operator sends false messages claiming
to come from third persons. Id. Likewise, an employer is liable when the manager of its store is
able to cheat customers because of his position. Id. While these examples are not exhaustive,
they clearly support the proposition that an employer will be held liable for an employee's
misconduct when the employer places the employee in a position that enables him to engage in
the wrongful activity.
198. Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 462. See also Katherine S. Anderson, Employer Liability Under
Title WI for Sexual Harassment After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1258,
1274 (1987) (suggesting vicarious liability may follow from agency principles when a supervisor
acts as "employer's surrogate in the day-to-day management of his subordinates"); Note, Sexual
Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title WI, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1449, 1461
(1984) (arguing that when the employer gives the supervisor the power to structure the work
environment, the employer is vicariously liable for the supervisor's abuse of that authority to
create the hostile work environment).
199. Compare Barnes, 561 F.2d at 995-96 (MacKinnon, J., concurring). Judge MacKinnon
has recognized that "[i]n every case where vicarious liability is at issue, the agent will have been
aided in some way in committing the tort by the position that he holds." Id. at 996. MacKinnon
claims that this reading of the second clause of Section 219(2)(d) argues too much. Id. He
supports this position by pointing out that, "It]he examples provided in the Restatement
commentary... indicate that a narrower concept is involved." Id. Since the opportunity
provided by the agency relation is no more than would be provided in any employment setting
and does not create an incentive for tortious conduct, Judge MacKinnon concludes that the
avenue of employer liability provided by the second clause of Section 219(2)(d) does not apply in
the sexual harassment context. Id.
200. To establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual harassment,
plaintiffs must prove some basis for employer liability. See note 8-10 and the accompanying
text. To determine whether this element has been satisfied, a court has two options. First, it
could embark on the somewhat lengthy and complicated analysis of agency principles presented
in this Note, to determine whether employer liability should attach. See Part III. Second, by
recognizing that the Section 219(2)(d) analysis is broad enough to subsume the other avenues of
employer liability available under common-law agency principles, the court could simplify its
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The Tenth Circuit applied this analysis in Sauers v. Salt Lake
County.201 The court held that when a supervisor wields significant
control over the victim's hiring, firing, or conditions of employment,
the supervisor operates as the alter ego of the employer.202 The
employer, therefore, could be held liable for its supervisor's
misconduct. 203 The court noted that liability would be imposed if the
harasser was aided in accomplishing the harassment by his
relationship to the employer.20 4 Consequently, the court held that a
claim of hostile environment harassment against the individual
defendant was a claim against the employer itself.205
While the employer would be liable in most cases for the su-
pervisor's behavior under the second clause of Section 219(2)(d),
courts have pointed out that rare exceptions are possible, and
therefore the employer is not always automatically liable.2°6 Thus in
Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dept.,2 7 the Tenth Circuit
refused to hold an employer liable when the plaintiff presented no
evidence that the harasser had any supervisory authority over her
whatsoever.20 8 The court reasoned that the only way the supervisor's
agency relationship could aid him in the accomplishment of the har-
assment was that he would not have been in the workplace but for his
job.20 9 Concluding that holding an employer liable in these circum-
stances would be too broad a reading of Section 219(2)(d), the court
inquiry by simply asking whether the supervisor was aided by the agency relation in
committing the harassment. This inquiry can be further simplified by asking only whether the
supervisor abused the authority entrusted to him by his employer in creating a hostile work
environment. Thus, the employer liability prong of a plaintiffs prima facie case could be
replaced simply by requiring proof that the harasser abused his supervisory authority in
creating a hostile work environment. Part III.E.
201. 1 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993). The court first pointed out that "[tihe employer is not
always liable for sexual harassment by its supervisors." Id. at 1125 n.3 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S.
at 72). It went on to hold that under agency principles an employer could be liable if the agent
acted within the course and scope of his employment, if the employer was negligent, or "if the
harassers acted under apparent authority from the employer or were aided in accomplishing the
harassment by their relationship to the employer." Id. (citing Hirschfeld, 916 F.2d at 576-79).
See also Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1418 (10th Cir. 1987).
202. Sauers, 1 F.3d at 1125 (quoting Paroline, 879 F.2d at 104).
203. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. 1604.11(c)).
204. Id. at 1125 n.3 (citing Hirschfeld, 916 F.2d at 576-79).
205. Id. at 1125.
206. As Justice Marshall pointed out in Meritor, when a supervisor has no authority over
an employee because the two work in different parts of the employer's business, it may be
improper to impose liability. While Justice Marshall is correct in principle, his specific example
may not always hold true. See the text following note 214.
207. 916 F.2d at 572.
208. Id. at 579-80.
209. Id. at 579 (agreeing with the trial court).
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recommended reading the second half of Section 219(2)(d) in the con-
text of what precedes it.21° The court did not elaborate further on
what it meant by this cryptic statement. If it meant to imply that the
apparent authority inquiry and the aided by the agency relation
analysis are not distinct inquiries, this recommendation seems to
contradict the plain language of the Restatement. However, if it
meant only that an employer should not be liable for a supervisor's
harassment when that supervisor did not use his position of authority
to aid him in the harassment, the court's conclusion is defensible.
The proper inquiry of whether a supervisor was aided by the
agency relation is a fact-based inquiry that depends on the circum-
stances of the case. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that
to make this determination, the finder of fact must decide: (1)
whether the employer delegated the authority to the supervisor to
control the situation of which the plaintiff complains; (2) whether the
supervisor exercised that authority; (3) whether the exercise of
authority resulted in a violation of Title VII; and (4) whether the
authority delegated by the employer to the supervisor aided the su-
pervisor in injuring the plaintiff.21 If each of these four conditions is
met, the employer is liable for the supervisor's harassment.212
The New Jersey court pointed out that while this standard is
distinct from strict liability, which would result in employer liability
regardless of the facts of the case, its standard would often result in
employers being held vicariously liable for such harassment. 21 3
However, the court felt that in some cases strict liability would be
unjust. The court explained that when a supervisor rapes a subordi-
nate in the workplace, for example, employer liability might not
attach.214
These courts failed to recognize, however, that even supervi-
sors who lack direct authority over the victim of their harassment will
often be aided by the agency relation when committing that harass-
ment. One example is when the supervisor calls the victim into his
office and sexually harasses her there.21 5  If he did not occupy a
210. Id.
211. Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 462. See also Bruce Chandler Smith, When Should an
Employer Be Held Liable for the Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor Who Creates a Hostile Work
Environment? A Proposed Theory of Liability, 19 Ariz. St. L. J. 285, 321 (1987).
212. Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 462.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 464 (quoting the trial court, 255 N.J. Super. 616, 605 A.2d 1125, 1149 (1992)
(Skillman, J., dissenting)).
215. This would include the situation of a supervisor raping his subordinate. But see id.
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position of authority, he probably would not be able to direct the
victim into his office. In fact, but for his supervisory status, he may
not even have an office. Furthermore, supervisors are traditionally
accorded more freedom to roam around the workplace unimpeded by
close supervision. If the supervisor takes advantage of this freedom
by going to other departments to commit harassment, he is taking
advantage of that freedom and is thereby being aided by the existence
of the agency relation.
Even supervisors who do not have direct supervisory authority
over an individual subordinate employee do have power over that
employee by virtue of the corporate hierarchy. One supervisor may
take advantage of his position by threatening to exert influence over
another supervisor who does have authority over his targeted victim.
By using his position in the company hierarchy to create a hostile
work environment for the victim, such a supervisor is aided by the
agency relation regardless of whether he has direct authority over the
victim.
The proper question for the court to ask, therefore, is whether
under the circumstances of the case, the perpetrator of the
harassment can more properly be considered a co-worker of the
victim, or whether he is, in fact, a supervisor exercising direct or
indirect authority over a subordinate.216 If the harasser is acting in a
supervisory capacity when he creates a hostile work environment, he
will necessarily be aided by the agency relation, and liability should
properly be imputed to his employer.217
In Karibian v. Columbia University, the Second Circuit inter-
preted the second clause of § 219(2)(d) in precisely this manner.218
The court recognized that when a supervisor creates a hostile work
environment through the use of his delegated authority, agency prin-
ciples suggest that the employer's liability is absolute.219 The court
held that an employer is liable for a supervisor's hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment if the supervisor uses his authority to
216. See Karibian v. Columbia University, 14 F.3d 773, 780 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing that
"where a low-level supervisor does not rely on his supervisory authority to carry out the har-
assment, the situation will generally be indistinguishable fiom cases in which the harassment is
perpetrated by the plaintiffs co-workers").
217. See id. (recognizing that "[clommon law principles of agency suggest that in such
circumstances the employer's liability is absolute").
218. Id. at 779-81.
219. Id. at 780.
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further the harassment,220 or if he was aided in accomplishing the
harassment by the agency relationship.21
Applying this standard, the court held that the employer was
liable for its supervisor's hostile work environment harassment re-
gardless of the absence of notice or the reasonableness of its com-
plaint procedures.222 The court bolstered its conclusion by pointing
out the 'Jarring anomaly" that would be created if it were to hold that
conduct which always renders an employer liable under quid pro quo
harassment does not result in liability when the same conduct be-
comes so severe and pervasive as to create a hostile work environ-
ment.2
3
Thus, an agency analysis will not lead to employer liability
only in those rare circumstances in which the supervisor does not
abuse his authority in such a way as to be aided by the agency rela-
tion and therefore more properly viewed as a co-worker of the victim
for purposes of Title VII.224 In those cases, courts uniformly agree
that employers should be liable under a negligence standard if they
knew or should have known of the hostile work environment and
failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action.22 5 In all other
cases, when someone who has been delegated power abuses that
220. See Part III.D (discussing employer liability under the apparent authority analysis).
221. Karibian, 14 F.3d at 780 (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219; 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11(c); Hirschfeld, 916 F.2d at 579; Sparks, 830 F.2d at 1559-60; Watts, 724 F. Supp. at 106
n.6).
222. Id. Holding employers absolutely liable under these circumstances would not create a
disincentive for employers to establish policies against harassment, or to respond adequately to
harassment of which they have knowledge. First, by establishing and then educating employees
about the existence of such a policy, some sexual harassment that might otherwise occur will be
prevented. See notes 164-68. Second, if an employer responds quickly and adequately to notice
of a hostile work environment, a victim may be persuaded not to file a lawsuit. Finally, courts
will properly take evidence of a policy against harassment and adequate remedial action into
account in assessing damages. Injunctive relief merely requires an employer to eliminate the
hostile work environment. Injunctive relief will therefore be unnecessary when the employer
has already responded adequately to notice of the harassment. Reinstatement and backpay will
generally be unnecessary under these circumstances because the victim will have remained in
her job, or at least will have been absent for a short period of time. Furthermore, when the
employer has done all it reasonably could have done to prevent harassment from occurring and
promptly remedied it in those cases in which it has occurred, compensatory damages will be
difficult for the plaintiff to prove, or should, at any rate, be minimal. Finally, punitive damages
should not be assessed when an employer has an effective policy against harassment in place
and has responded adequately to any harassment which has occurred. See generally Lehmann,
626 A.2d at 624-25 (discussing an assessment of damages under a strict application of agency
principles); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 77-78 (Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing the relief sought by
a plaintiff under Title VII).
223. Karibian, 14 F.3d at 781.
224. See note 216 and accompanying text.
225. See note 16 and accompanying text.
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power to create a hostile work environment for a subordinate, the
source of that power should be held accountable. Only in this way
will the law assure that those with power wield it appropriately. 2 6
From this principle follows Justice Stevens' observation that using
agency principles for guidance2 7 will impute liability to the employer
regardless of whether the employee gave notice of the offense.228
IV. A STRICT APPLICATION OF AGENCY PRINCIPLES IS APPROPRIATE
AS A MATTER OF SOUND POLICY
A. Consistency With Other Title VII Causes of Action
Courts have held employers strictly liable for supervisory
misconduct under every other cause of action available under Title
VII, including quid pro quo sexual harassment.229 Those courts that
have imposed a notice requirement on plaintiffs seeking to recover for
hostile environment sexual harassment have failed to articulate le-
gitimate reasons why this cause of action should be treated differ-
ently. The most articulate defense of the disparate treatment af-
forded the supervisory hostile work environment cause of action was
set forth by Judge Bork in a dissenting opinion from the denial to
226. In these circumstances, the employer would be liable because the supervisor was
"aided by the agency relation" in committing the harassment. The existence of a grievance
procedure would not change this fact, and therefore, would not alleviate an employer's liability
under Section 219(2)(d). In Bouton, 29 F.3d at 110, the court explicitly recognized that this
choice is a policy decision based on the appropriate amount of deterrence. The court pointed out
that "[ilf employers are liable whenever supervisors harass their subordinates, they have an
economic incentive in the amount of the potential judgments to recruit, train, and supervise
their managers to prevent hostile environments." Id. Nonetheless, the court argued that the
"[miarginal reduction in the incentive that occurs if employers can rely on an internal grievance
procedure may be justified by the concomitant decrease in litigation." Id.
The problem with this approach is that the decrease in litigation comes at the expense of
legitimate victims of sexual harassment who do not bring claims because there is no one from
whom they can recover. On the other hand, decreasing the factual burden on a plaintiff by no
longer requiring her to show employer knowledge or to litigate the merits of a grievance
procedure would lead to decreased litigation costs: trials would be less prolonged, fewer appeals
would be required, and fewer remands of cases improperly disposed of at summary judgment
would occur. Not only would this lighter factual burden result in increased efficiency, but
victims of sexual harassment would have greater incentive to come forward, since there would
be a greater chance of relief.
227. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
228. Id. at 78 (Marshall, J., concurring).
229. See note 11 and accompanying text (citing cases of quid pro quo sexual harassment).
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rehear Vinson v. Taylor230 en banc. Judge Bork claimed that the
panel's decision to impose strict liability made the employer an in-
surer that all relationships between supervisors and employees were
entirely asexual.231 Judge Bork complained that even though the
employer may have no way of preventing sexual relationships,22 it
must pay if they occur and are then characterized as harassment.233
Judge Bork then suggested that the D.C. Circuit should have
reached the question of an employer's vicarious liability under Title
VII for misconduct it knew nothing of and had done all it reasonably
could to prevent.234 Bork suggested that in answering this question,
the court should not import wholesale notions of liability that evolved
in lower court cases involving racial discrimination. He suggested
instead that some Title VII doctrines require modification before they
can be applied in sexual harassment cases.235 He noted that vicarious
liability is one such doctrine since it is unlikely that a supervisor
would commit sexual harassment within the scope of his employment,
and because supervisors engaging in such harassment would
ordinarily know that their employer did not approve of their
actions.236
There are several problems with Judge Bork's critique of the
application of agency principles to hostile work environment sexual
harassment cases. First, he argued that the employer in Vinson could
not have done more to avoid liability without monitoring or policing
its employees' voluntary sexual relationships.237 In Meitor, however,
Justice Rehnquist explicitly pointed out the inadequacies of the
bank's grievance procedure and noted that a plaintiff's failure to use a
grievance procedure might insulate the employer from liability if such
procedure was better calculated to encourage victims of harassment to
come forward.m It is clear, therefore, that Meritor Savings Bank
could have taken action to avoid liability.29
230. 760 F.2d at 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 1331.
232. Judge Bork claimed that in the case at bar, the employer could not have done more to
avoid liability without monitoring or policing its employees' voluntary sexual relationships.
Such a policy would be both outrageous and expensive to enforce. Id. at 1331 & n.3.
233. Id. at 1331.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1332.
237. Id. at 1331 & n.3. See note 232 and accompanying text.
238. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72-73.
239. "If procedures are viable and do not denigrate the victim, they will be used. Typically,
too, an administrative complaint precedes suit, which provides the defendant ample opportunity
1995] 1097
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Second, Judge Bork expressed concern about the employer's
ability to police voluntary sexual relationships in the workplace and
the desirability of doing so.240 Truly consensual sexual relationships,
however, are not proscribed by Title VII. The gravamen of any sexual
harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were
unwelcome.241 Judge Bork and other advocates of a notice standard
are really concerned that a female participant in a consensual sexual
relationship will bring a sexual harassment claim when that relation-
ship sours.242
Concededly difficult factual issues revolve around whether
sexual behavior was welcome. However, just because a difficult fac-
tual inquiry is necessary to resolve a sexual harassment claims does
not mean that a more relaxed standard of employer liability is appro-
priate. Plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases already face significant
burdens, including proving that the harassment was "severe or perva-
sive," and proving the existence of any psychological damages that
they are claiming.23 In fact, some commentators argue that "the rules
of credibility are stacked against women."244
Commentators have also recognized that the outcomes and
reasoning of many sexual harassment cases reveal a general distrust
of women.245  This distrust may result in courts failing to impose
liability on harassers because they might be innocent.26  Thus
employer liability attaches only when "the harasser's behavior is
offensive enough, and the employment consequences serious enough,
to elicit the sympathy of judges who [harbor] the attitudes and beliefs
to which sexual harassment law" objects.24
to cure or settle short of liability. The available range of motion is far beyond the picture of
virtual entrapment" Judge Bork portrays. Respondents Brief at 38 (cited in note 9).
240. Vinson, 760 F.2d at 1331 & n.3.
241. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68 (citing 29 CFR § 1604.11(a)).
242. See Vinson, 760 F.2d at 1331 (Bork, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that employers
will have to pay if sexual relationships occur and harassment is later alleged).
243. Compare Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371 (holding that a plaintiff states a cause of action for
hostile work environment sexual harassment as long as the environment would reasonably be
perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, without need to prove the conduct was also
psychologically injurious).
244. Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 813, 853 (1991).
245. Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of
Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 Yale L. J. 1177, 1208 (1990).
246. Lutner, 1993 U. ill, L. Rev. at 623 (cited in note 14).
247. Frug, Women and the Law at 182 (cited in note 5). Under this reasoning, it is
irrelevant that a hostile environment case involves the same abuse of supervisory power as does
a quid pro quo case.
Courts [hesitate] to impose liability for hostile environment sexual harassment because
the claim encompasses behavior that men welcome and find unobjectionable. Courts
1098 [Vol. 48:1057
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A third critique of Judge Bork's argument stems from the fact
that while hostile environment sexual harassment is rarely engaged
in within the scope of a supervisor's employment, and often is explic-
itly disapproved of by the employer, the same is true in cases of quid
pro quo sexual harassment. Yet courts uniformly hold employers
strictly liable for this cause of action. Outside of the explanation
commentators provide as to why hostile work environment sexual
harassment is treated differently from this cause of action, namely a
general distrust of women and a belief that this cause of action is less
serious,28 it is difficult to perceive of any valid reason why employer
liability should not attach to claims of a supervisor's hostile environ-
ment harassment. The reason for holding an employer liable for su-
pervisory harassment in other contexts-the supervisor's abuse of the
power delegated to him by his employer-is equally compelling in the
hostile environment sexual harassment context. Therefore courts
should treat this cause of action the same way, by holding employers
liable for the violations of Title VII perpetrated by supervisors who
abuse their authority.
A fourth flaw with Judge Bork's argument is that a notice
requirement is superfluous and contradictory. All courts would hold
an employer liable for co-worker harassment if the victim reports the
harassment to her supervisor who then fails to respond with adequate
remedial measures.24 9 Yet a number of courts would not hold an
employer liable for the hostile work environment created by the
supervisor.50 This simply does not make sense. Knowledge of the
supervisor who creates the hostile work environment should be
viewed as knowledge of the employer, imputing liability to the
employer for a supervisor's harassment, regardless of whether higher-
level management personnel were made aware of it.
perceive hostile environment harassment as less serious than quid pro quo harassment,
and the fear of imposing liability for 'acceptable' conduct or conduct perceived as beyond
the employer's control gives courts a vested interest in maintaining a lesser standard of
employer liability for the 'less serious' cause of action.
Lutner, 193 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 624. See also Gutek, Sex and the Workplace 159-64 (cited in note
5) (arguing that unlike women, men consider a sexualized work environment part of the
employment institution's background and are more likely to consider sexual overtures and
comments appropriate work behavior). Evidence indicates that a majority of men believe
women appreciate sexual overtures at work, and that men seldom label such incidents as sexual
harassment. Id.
248. See notes 5, 14, and 244-47 and accompanying text.
249. See notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
250. See notes 145-48 and accompanying text (arguing that supervisor knowledge should be
imputed to the employer).
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B. Policies Supporting a Strict Application of Agency Principles
1. EEOC Guidelines
The EEOC Guidelines support a strict standard of employer
liability, as they provide for employer liability in cases of both quid
pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment.25' The Supreme
Court has traditionally accorded the Guidelines great deference,252 in
part because they are only adopted after a 60-day public comment
period.253 The Meritor Court recognized that its holding was in some
tension with these guidelines, 254 but explained its conclusion by
referring to the language in the Guidelines requiring a court to make
a factual inquiry to determine whether the harasser acted as a
supervisor.255 The Court wrongly interpreted this language to mean
that a supervisor does not necessarily act within his supervisory
functions when he creates a hostile work environment. The Court
intimated that although the sexual harassment occurs on the job, the
supervisor stops being an agent when he creates a hostile work envi-
ronment.
However, as one commentator points out, this language refers
to the process of determining whether an employee is in a supervisory
position.25 Once the employee is deemed a supervisor, the Guidelines
251. EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c).
252. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 74 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34).
253. See 45 Fed. Reg. at 74676 (cited in note 65), which states that during the period avail-
able for public comment:
[t]he greatest number of comments, including many from employers, were those
commending the Commission for publishing guidelines on the issue of sexual
harassment, as well as for the content of the guidelines.
The second highest number of comments specifically referred to § 1604.11(c) which
defines employer liability with respect to acts of supervisors and agents. Many
commentators, especially employers, expressed the view that the liability of employers
under this section is too broad and unsupported by case law. However, the strict
liability imposed in § 1604.11(c) is in keeping with the general standard of employer
liability with respect to agents and supervisory employees. Similarly, the Commission
and the courts have held for years that an employer is liable if a supervisor or an agent
violates the Title VII, regardless of knowledge or any other mitigating factor.... In
keeping with this standard, the Commission, after full consideration of the comments
and the accompanying concerns, will let §1604.11(c) stand as it is now worded.
254. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 71-72. The Guidelines advocate strict liability for supervisory
harassment. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c).
255. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 71.
256. Maria M. Carrillo, Hostile Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor Under Title VII:
Reassessment of Employer Liability in Light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 24 Colum. Hum. Rts.
L. Rev. 41, 75-76 (1992-93).
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clearly state that an employer should be liable.257  The Court,
therefore, was mistaken, not only in its interpretation of the EEOC
Guidelines, but also in its belief that a supervisor is not performing
his job duties when he creates a hostile work environment. One of the
duties entrusted to supervisory personnel is the authority to
supervise and control the work environment. When that authority is
abused, the harasser acts in his supervisory capacity, and the
employer should be held accountable for the abuse of that authority.
2. Employer Incentives
A strict standard of employer liability promotes the goals of
Title VII by creating the strongest incentives for employers to estab-
lish preventive measures and provides the maximum opportunity for
victims to recover. 258 Holding employers liable for the hostile work
environment created by its supervisory personnel encourages employ-
ers to establish effective preventive mechanisms, educate both super-
visors and subordinates on what behavior will not be tolerated in the
workplace, and discover and redress hostile work environments in
existence.
3. Economic Arguments
Holding employers liable for the hostile work environment
sexual harassment of its supervisory personnel is also appropriate for
economic reasons. Professor Allan Q. Sykes argues that prospective
employees of a company have little information about the probability
and seriousness of workplace harassment prior to accepting a job.259
Once harassment become apparent, a victim might be able to quit and
find a different job.260 The costs of doing so, however, including search
costs and the costs of lost training, may outweigh the benefits. 2 6'
Even if the victim does quit, she may have already incurred signifi-
257. Specifically, the Guidelines provide that "the Commission will examine the
circumstances of the particular employment relation and the job junctions [sic] performed by the
individual in determining whether the individual acts in either a supervisory or agency
capacity." 29 C.F.R §1604.11(c) (quoted fully in note 44).
258. Carillo at 84. See also Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 230 (1982) (pointing out
that "Title VII's primary goal, of course, is to end discrimination").
259. Alan Q. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the
Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 563, 605-06 (1988).
260. Id. at 606.
261. Id.
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cant and potentially unredressable injury. Moreover, it is doubtful
that a market solution to the problem of sexual harassment will
emerge because an employer could hire another employee at the same
rate of pay. If a market solution does not occur, employers will not
bear the costs of harassment caused by their business. Employers
may also refuse to adopt cost-effective policies to discourage
harassment, absent the imposition of liability.2 62
Employers often cannot observe acts of harassment and there-
fore, they cannot often intervene to prevent specific instances of har-
assment.263 They can, however, promulgate policies under which
perpetrators of harassment are discharged or otherwise penalized.2
These incentives are likely to be effective for all supervisors who value
long-term relationships with their employers.265 Whatever incentives
employer liability might create for meritless suits, these incentives
would be counter-balanced by existing disincentives for victims to
raise meritorious suits.266 Therefore, defending sexual harassment
lawsuits will cost employers less than the cost of the harassment
imposed upon victims. 267
Assuming some incentives would enable an employer to limit
the amount of sexual harassment that occurs, and assuming that
frivolous lawsuits are not a serious problem, Sykes concludes that
employers should be liable for supervisory harassment.268 Sykes
bolsters this conclusion by pointing out that the causal relationship
between a supervisor's harassment and the employment relationship
is strong, and that the market will not provide an efficient solution to
the problem.269
262. Id. Sykes argues that if harassment is caused by an employer's enterprise, strict
liability should be imposed. Id. He goes on to conclude that a strong argument can be made
that supervisory harassment is caused by the employer's enterprise, whether or not it is of the
quid pro quo variety. Id. This is so because "sexual harassment by supervisors is often
facilitated by a position of authority. Absent the existence of [the supervisory authority], the
supervisor would have no leverage over the subordinate, and the likelihood of sexual
harassment would be significantly reduced." Id. at 606-07 (citation omitted). While Sykes felt
that the argument for employer liability is strongest in the quid pro quo case, he also recognized
that for the same reasons, the argument is "quite strong" for a supervisor's hostile environment
harassment. Id. at 607.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 607-08.
269. Id. at 608.
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In Horn v. Duke Homes, Division of Windsor Mobile Homes,
Inc., 270 the Seventh Circuit used similar economic arguments to justify
a finding of employer liability for supervisory sexual harassment. The
Seventh Circuit pointed out that a company is a legal form that can
only act through its appointed agents. 271 Explaining the reason be-
hind the doctrine of respondeat superior, the court stated that the
employer should bear the cost of the torts of its employees as a
required cost of doing business because it is a more efficient risk
bearer than the innocent plaintiff.2 72 The court pointed out that sex
discrimination can best be eliminated by enforcing a rule of liability
that "ensures compensation for victims and creates an incentive for
the employer to take the strongest possible affirmative measures to
prevent the hiring and retention of sexist supervisors. ' 73
4. Fairness of Remedies
Not only would a strict application of agency principles lead to
an economically efficient result, but it would also further the goals of
Title VII. A strict application of agency principles advances Title
VII's goals by providing redress to victims of discrimination without
imposing an undue or unfair burden on employers.24 Providing
injunctive relief merely requires an employer to rid its workplace of
270. 755 F.2d 599 (7th Cir. 1985).
271. Id. at 605.
272. Id. (citing Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2nd Cir. 1968);
Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 69 at 459 (cited in note 101); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on
Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L. J. 499, 543-45 (1961)).
273. Id. The existence of sexual discrimination and harassment also causes serious eco-
nomic harms to employers. Hearings on H.R. 1 at 207-14 (cited in note 164). Dr. Freada Klein,
a researcher and consultant to large companies on sexual harassment, has estimated that the
cost of sexual harassment for a typical Fortune 500 company of 23,784 employees is over $6.7
million per year, not counting the costs of litigation, processing state or federal charges, and
destructive behavior or sabotage. Id. The $6.7 million figure comes from the costs of employee
turnover, absenteeism, reduced productivity, and the use of internal complaint mechanisms. Id.
at 210-14. That harm to the corporation necessarily harms the economy of the state and the
welfare of its citizens. Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 456. It is in everyone's interest, therefore, to
eliminate sexual harassment from the workplace. See also United States Merit Systems
Protection Board, Sexual Harassment in the Federal Government: An Update 39 (1988)
(reporting that, as a result of sexual harassment, the federal government lost $267 million from
May 1985 to May 1987 due to lost productivity, sick leave, and employee replacement costs).
274. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (recognizing Title VII's
purpose of "the elimination of discrimination in the workplace"). See also Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,418 (1975) (claiming that compensation for injuries caused by prohibited
discrimination is another purpose of Title VII).
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discrimination.275 By awarding other equitable remedies such as rein-
statement, backpay, and compensatory damages, a court can ensure
that victims receive make-whole relief. The provision of such dam-
ages would encourage employers to take preventive measures and
would also encourage them to respond promptly and effectively to
allegations of harassment in order to minimize their damages. 76
Furthermore, by leaving open the possibility of punitive damages,
courts can ensure that employers that refuse to implement preventive
mechanisms or to respond adequately to known harassment under-
stand that this behavior will no longer be tolerated in our society.
Hence, a strict application of agency principles advances Title VII's
two primary goals of eliminating discrimination from the American
workplace, as well as providing appropriate remedies for its victims.
V. CONCLUSION
In Meritor, the majority opinion directed lower courts to use
agency principles for guidance in determining when it is appropriate
to hold employers liable for supervisory hostile work environment
sexual harassment.277 In a concurring opinion, Justice Marshall
opined that under Title VII, an employer is responsible for the acts of
its supervisory employees.278 Justice Stevens, failing to ascertain any
inconsistency between the opinions of his colleagues, joined in both
opinions. 279
This Note has embarked on a detailed examination of common-
law agency principles in the sexual harassment context and concluded
that Justice Stevens was correct. Under Section 219 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency, employer liability is appropriate
whenever an employer delegates the authority to control the work
environment to a supervisor who subsequently abuses that authority.
This result is appropriate as a matter of sound policy. A strict
application of agency principles also advances Title VII's twin goals of
eliminating discrimination from the workplace and ensuring adequate
275. See note 222 (discussing assessment of damages against employer with policy against
harassment who responds adequately to notice of the harassment).
276. Id.
277. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
278. Id. at 75 (Marshall, J., concurring).
279. Id. at 74 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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remedies for victims of sexual harassment by holding employers
responsible for the hostile work environments of their supervisors.
Glen Allen Staszewski*
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